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A

WILLIAM L. PROSSER*

insurance, once completed, tends to take on
many of the characteristics of a status,' or a fiduciary relationship, 2 it remains in its inception a contract. As in the case of
any other contract, to create an effective agreement of insurance,
the minds of the parties must meet and concur as to terms ;' there
must be an expression of mutual assent. Until such an expression
can be found, the insurance company has assumed no liability. In
connection with the making of the contract of insurance, a rather
involved and difficult body of case law has grown up, of which the
Minnesota cases afford an interesting cross-section.
Because of the large volume of business transacted, and for
their own protection, insurance companies have developed a more
or less standardized method of making their contracts.' The indiLTHEOUGH

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
'The suggestion that insurance is a status appears to have originated
with the comment of Pound, Spirit of the Common Law 28, upon the generalization of Sir Henry Maine, that the evolution of law is a progress from
status to contract: "Taking no account of legislative limits upon freedom
of contract, in the purely judicial development of our law we have taken
the law of insurance practically out of the category of contract ....
What
is this . . . but the common-law idea of relation, a relation of insurer and
insured . . . and of rights, duties and liabilities involved therein?"
Another sentence much quoted in this connection is that of Professor
Woodruff, in his Cases on Insurance: "What do they know of the law of
the insurance contract who only the law of contract know?"
2See for example Colby v. Life Indemnity & Investment Co., (1894)
57 Minn. 510, 59 N. W. 539, where it was held that a misrepresentation by
a mutual life insurance company of its right to make assessments entitled
the insured to relief, even though the misrepresentation was one of law,
since the company occupied a fiduciary position toward its members.
'Wales v. New York Bowery Fire Ins. Co., (1887) 37 Minn. 106, 33 N.
W. 322; Heiman v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., (1871) 17 .Minn. 153 (Gil.
127), 10 Am. Rep. 154; Olson v. American Central Life Ins. Co., (1927)
172 Minn. 511, 216 N. W. 225.
4
Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy, (1919) 33 Harv.
L. Rev. 198; Vance, Handbook of the Law of Insurance, 2d ed., 174.
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vidual who is to be insured is induced, usually by a soliciting agent
or some other representative of the company, to sign a formal
document, designated an "application," which takes the form of an
offer looking toward a contract of insurance. In this application,
he is required to answer a number of questions giving the coipany such information as it may desire concerning the subject of
the proposed insurance. The application is filled in on a printed
form provided by the company, and drawn by its attorneys, and
the applicant seldom is given any opportunity to suggest or change
any of the terms of his offer. The application is forwarded by
the agent, either directly or through a district office, to the home
office of the company, where it is examined carefully by the proper
officials. If it is approved, a policy of insurance is prepared upon
a printed form, and is executed by the officers of the company.
This policy is forwarded to the agent, who hands it over to the
applicant. At this time, if not before, the first premium due under
the policy is paid by tile applicant. At some point along this line
of procedure the contract is complete. Of course this method of
making the contract is not compulsory, and may be departed from
at will,' but the number of cases in which it is not followed probably is negligible.
The problems arising in connection with this standardized procedure nay conveniently be discussed under the following topics:
1. The completion of the contract by a preliminary agrccmnt.
before any formal policy is issued by the company.
2. The acceptance of the application, and the delivery of the
policy.
3. The effect of conditions in the application or the policy upon
the completion of the contract.
4. The effect of delivery to tie insured of a policy which,
because of mistake or misconduct on the part of the company's
agent, does not provide the insurance applied for.
1. COMPLETION OF THE CONTRACT BEFORE ISSUANCE OF TIlE

POLICY

There is no requirement of the law that an insurance contract
must be in writing. Dicta to the contrary in a few early decisions
5

For example, the application may be by letter direct to the home office

of the company.

534.

See Scheffer v. National Life Ins. Co., (1879) 25 Minn.
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have been discredited.6 Provided only that the insurance is to take
effect within one year,' the statute of frauds has no application to
insurance agreements, since the contingency upon which the insurer
is to perform may easily occur at once. 8 Even a contract of guaranty or fidelity insurance, which is regarded in some jurisdictions
as a "special promise to answer for the debt, default or doings of
another," 9 is held in Minnesota to be an original undertaking on the
part of the insurer, and so is not within the statute.10
Thus it is entirely possible that a complete contract of insurance
may be made before any written policy is issued. The complexity
of the ordinary insurance contract, and the length of time for
which it is to run will render it very necessary as a practical matter that the agreement be reduced to writing, but the existence of
the contract does not depend upon it. It follows that any duly
authorized agent may bind the insurance company to such a contract, without the formality of any writing at all.
The decided cases usually turn upon the authority of the
agent. In the absence of such authority, either actual or apparent,
of course no agreement of an insurance agent can impose any
contractual liability upon his company. 1 Actual authority to
conclude contracts rarely is given to the agents of life insurance
companies, 12 for the reason that the company reserves the right to
6See Cockerill v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., (1847) 16 Ohio 148; Platho v.
Merchants Ins. Co., -(1866) 38 Mo. 254; Bell v. Western Ins. Co., (1843)
5 Rob. (La.) 423, 39 Am. Dec. 542. Compare Dayton Ins. Co. v. Kelly,
(1873) 24 Ohio St 345, 15 Am. Rep. 61; Henning v. United States Ins. Co.,
(1871) 47 Mo. 425, 4 Am. Rep. 322; Stockton v. Firemen's Ins. Co., (1881)
33 La. Ann. 577, 39 Am. Rep. 277.
7See Wiebeler v. Milwaukee Mechanics' Mut. Ins. Co., (1883) 30 Minn.
464, 16 N. W. 363.
sWiebeler v. Milwaukee Mechanics' Mut. Ins. Co., (1883) 30 Minn.
464, 916 N. W. 363.
Wainwright Trust Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,
(1916) 63 Ind. App. 309, 114 N. E. 470; Commonwealth v. Hinson. (1911)
143 Ky. 428, 136 S. W. 912, L. R. A. 1917B 139, Ann. Cas. 1912D 291.
lOQuinn-Shepherdson Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,
(1919) 142 Minn. 428, 172 N. W. 693. See also Pearson v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., (1917) 138 Minn. 240, 164 N. W. 919; W. A.
Thomas Co. v. National Surety Co., (1919) 142 Minn. 460, 172 N. W. 697.
The distinction between a contract of guaranty and a contract of insurance
is explained in Vance, Handbook of the Law of Insurance, 2d ed., pp. 57-60.
"Guernsey v. American Ins. Co., (1871) 17 Minn. 104 (Gil. 83) ; Morse
v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., (1875) 21 Minn. 407; see Megaarden v.
Hartman Furniture Co., (1911) 114 Minn. 224, 130 N. W. 1027.
"-°Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy, (1919) 33 Harv.
L. Rev. 198; see Neuberger v. Aid Association for Lutherans, (Wis. 1932)
240 N. W. 885; Hertz v. Security Mut. Ins. Co., (1915) 131 Minn. 147, 154
N. W. 745; Olson v. American Central Life Ins. Co., (1927) 172 Minn.
511, 216 N. W. 225.
Life insurance agents sometimes are given authority to issue "binding"

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

pass upon the medical report at its home office, and to approve the
risk. But fire insurance agents more frequently are given the
power to accept the risk and complete the contract-a fact of which
the courts occasionally have taken notice. 3 Where such actual
authority can be established, an oral agreement made by the agent
1 4

will be given effect.

The problem of apparent authority offers much greater difficulty, since it may involve a variety of fact situations. It is, of
course, clear that there can be no apparent authority of an agent
where the applicant for insurance is fully in formed that the agent
has no power to conclude a contract with him." Nor can apparent
authority be established merely by the declarations of the agent
himself, unsupported by independent proof."6 It must rest upon
evidence of custom, or upon appearances.1 7 If it is to be based
on the custom of the insurance company itself, the custom must
be proved by evidence of more than a single instance in which it
has been followed.' 8 If it is to be a general usage of the insurance
slips or receipts for temporary insurance pending action on the application.
See the text at footnotes 32-38 below.
"3See Neuberger v. Aid Association for Lutherans, (Wis. 1932) 240
N. W. 885; Hertz v. Security Mut. Ins. Co., (1915) 131 Minn. 147, 154
N. W. 745.
"It is well known that fire insurance is often effected by parol, with the
understanding that a policy will be issued and delivered in the near future.
at which time the premium will be paid, or it may be agreed that the
premium shall be paid at some future definite time." Wieland v. St. Louis
County Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., (1920) 146 Minn. 255, 178 N. W. 499.
In Paull v. Columbian Nat. Fire Ins. Co., (1927) 171 Minn. 118, 213
N. W. 539, the record was held to show that the fire insurance agent had
authority to agree to make such entries upon the policy as would protect an
assignee.
' 4 Salisbury v. Hekla Fire Ins. Co., (1884) 32 Minn. 458, 21 N. W. 552;
Ganser v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., (1885) 34 Minn. 372, 25 N. W. 943;
Quinn-Shepherdson Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., (1919)
142 Minn. 428, 172 N. W. 693.
' 56 Scanlon v. Continental Ins. Co., (1907) 101 Minn. 537, 111 N. W. 1134.
1 See Mitchell v. Minnesota Fire Association, (1892) 48 Minn. 278, 51
N. W. 608; Jackson v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., (1900) 79 Minn. 43,
81 N.7 W. 545.
' See Megaarden v. Hartman Furniture Co., (1911) 114 Minn. 224, 130
N. W. 1027: Hamm Realty Co. v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., (1900)
80 Minn. 139, 83 N. W. 41.
18
"Where custom, habit or practice in business is to be relied upon a'
tending to establish an alleged fact and such custom, habit or practice are
to be established by specific instances, they must be numerous enough to
base an inference of systematic conduct. They must also have occurred
tinder substantially similar circumstances, so as to be naturally accountable
for by a system only and not as casual occurrences. They must be such
as to indicate a general course of conduct. It merely rests upon the basis
that a person is likely to do or not to do a thing as his custom, habit or
practice. But a single instance cannot give rise to a probability that it would
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business, it must be uniform and certain; it must be compulsory,
and of binding force, and not optional; and the party to be bound
by the usage must be in a position to have knowledge of it.i" The
practice of life insurance companies, by which soliciting agents

are given no power to approve risks, is so well known that the fact
that such an agent is authorized to solicit insurance gives him no
apparent authority to complete contracts.20 As to whether the
contrary practice of fire insurance companies- is sufficient to create
such apparent authority, there seems to be no definite decision in
this state. An early case2 2 might be taken to indicate that it is
not sufficient; but later cases have contained intimations that a
different result may be reached when the issue is presented."
be carried out in every instance or in most instances. It is the regularity
of such instances tending tq manifest a uniform mode of dealing that gives
probative value." Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Star Ins. Co., (19229) 178
Minn.9 526, 227 N. W. 850.
' "The custom may be so general, long-established and notorious that
the party is presumed to have knowledge of it, and he may also be engaged
in the same line of business himself to such an extent that he may be presumed to have knowledge of its customs." Nippolt v. Firemen's Ins. Co.,
(1894) 57 Minn. 275, 59 N. W. 191.
In Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Prince, (1892) 50 Minn. 53, 52 N. W. 131, 36
Am. St. Rep. 626, a local custom permitting agents to cancel policies issued
through them when the agency was cancelled was held to be subversive of
the principles on which the law of principal and agent is based, and so
without
20 effect.
"Such being the usual way of doing business by life insurance companies, no fault should be found with the finding of the trial court to the effect
that this defendant had not clothed its soliciting agent with apparent authority or power to make an oral contract of insurance. There was nothing in
defendant's method of doing business generally, or in any prior dealings
with the applicant Hertz, or in the business of life insurance as customarily
transacted, to require or countenance a finding of apparent authority in the
agent to make the alleged contract." Hertz v. Security Mut. Ins. Co., (1915)
131 Minn.
147, 154 N. W. 745.
21
See footnote 13.
22
Morse v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., (1875) 21 Minn. 407.
23
"We need not here determine whether there has been any departure
from the rule of the Morse case, for the difference in the methods employed
in procuring fire insurance risks from the ones used in effecting life insurance contracts, and the necessity for different methods, suggests cogent
reasons for holding that apparent authority is much more readily to be
inferred in the case of a soliciting agent of fire insurance than in one of
life." Hertz v. Security Mut. Ins. Co., (1915) 131 Minn. 147, 154 N. W. 745.
See also Wieland v. St. Louis County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., (1920) 146
Minn. 255, 178 N. W. 499; Olson v. American Central Life Ins. Co., (1927)
172 Minn. 511, 216 N. W. 225. And in Koivisto v. Bankers & Merchants
r
Fire Ins. Co., (1921) 148 Minn. 255, 181 N. V~
. 580, the trial court attached
to its findings a memorandum, saying that the Morse case was not in line
with the present day holdings. The supreme court opinion mentions the
memorandum without comment.

In Eastern Shore of Virginia Fire Ins. Co. v. Kellam, (Va. 1932) 165
S. E. 637, it is held that the apparent authority of even a general fire insurance agent to make an oral contract was limited to the time reasonably
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The past conduct of the agent, provided that it was known to
his company,2 4 may be sufficient to clothe him with apparent authority to repeat what he has done before. 2 A single act of an agent,
assuming authority, and a clear recognition by his principal, may
be sufficient to establish his authority in similar cases.26 One of
the important Minnesota decisions is Kaivisto v. Bankers & Merchants Fire Ins. Co., 2 T where a finding of authority23 of a fire
insurance agent to make an oral contract of insurance at the time
of the application was sustained upon the basis of evidence that it
was the practice of the company to antedate its policies to the date
of the application, and so to apply part of the premium paid to
cover the interval between the application and the issuance of the
policy. Since it cannot be presumed that the insurance company
intends to deal so unfairly with its patrons as to collect a premiluto
over a period during which there is no insurance, this practice of
dating back the policy logically should be interpreted to mean that
the insurance is intended to take effect at the earlier date ; ' or, if
this intention is negatived, the premiums should be payable at
pr6per intervals after the insurance really takes effect, regardless of
the provisions of the policy." This seems to be the law in Mintesota.
necessary to issue and deliver a written policy, plus a reasonable time to
cover21delays and a short period of grace.
Morse v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., (1875) 21 Minn. 407.
25Ames-Brooks Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., (1901) 83 Minn. 346, 86 N. W.
344; see Koivisto v. Bankers & Merchants Fire Ins. Co., (1921) 148 Mini.
255, 26
181 N. W. 580.
Ames-Brooks Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., (1901) 83 Minn. 346, 86 N. kV.
344.
27(1921)
148 Minn. 255, 181 N. W. 580.
28
"It is not important whether we call his authority apparent or implied.
Apparent authority is not actual authority. Implied authority is actual
authority circumstantially proved. It is the authority which the principal
intended his agent to possess. It includes all such things as are directly
connected with and essential to the business in hand .... The evidence that
tends to show implied authority may show apparent authority. The distinction is useful, but is not always observed and frequently there has been
some confusion. . . . We are not concerned with the correctness of the
court's classification of Mattson's authority. The question is whether there
was evidence to support a finding that there was authority." Koivisto v.
Bankers & Merchants Fire Ins. Co., (1921) 148 Minn. 255, 260, 181 N. WV.
580.
29Koivisto v. Bankers & Merchants Fire Ins. Co., (1921) 148 Minn.
255, 181 N. W. 580.
aOIn Olson v. American Central Life I-ns. Co., (1927) 172 Minn. 511.
216 N. W. 225, a provision in the application that "the insurance hereby
applied for shall not take effect until the payment of the first premium
thereon, and the approval of this application by the company" was held to
show an intention that no contract should exist until acceptance of the application,
notwithstanding the fact that the policy was to be antedated.
3
'Stramback v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co., (1905) 94 Minn. 281. 102
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In order to meet this situation, many life insurance companies"

have adopted the practice of issuing "binding" slips or receipts at
the time of the application, provided the first premium is paid in
advance. The receipt or the application 3 provides that, upon payment of the premium, the insurance shall be effective at once, if
the applicant was at that time an insurable risk as shown by the
medical examination. 34 The effect of the binding receipt is to
protect the applicant against loss between the date of the receipt
and the delivery of the policy, provided the application for insurance is accepted. 5 It is only recently that such contracts have come
N. W. 731. See also Olson v. American Central Life Ins. Co., (1927) 172
Minn. 511, 216 N. W. 225, citing in support of this proposition the following cases: McMaster v. New York Life Ins. Co., (1901) 183 U. S. 25, 22
Sup. Ct. 10, 46 L. Ed. 64; Stinchcombe v. New York Life Ins. Co., (1905)
46 Or. 316, 80 Pac. 213; Chestnut v. Security Mut. Life Ins. Co., (1921)
208 Mo. App. 130, 232 S. W. 203; Halsey v. American Central Life Ins. Co.,
(1914) 258 Mo. 659, 167 S. W. 951. The effect of the date of the policy on
the due date of premiums is discussed in notes in (1920) 6 A. L R. 774 and
(1924) 32 A. L. R. 1253, and in 3 Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law, sec.
634. 2
1n 1921 John A. Coke,. Jr., attorney for the Life Insurance Co. of
Virginia, found upon examination of the applications and policies of 125
life insurance companies that 25 of them carried such provisions. Coke.
The Commencement of the Risk in the Case of a Life Insurance Policy,
(May 4, 1921) Paper No. 51, 1 Proceedings of Ass'n of Life Insurance
Counsel.
33
The following provision in the application of the New York Life Insurance Co. is typical: "' . . . provided, however, that if the applicant, at

the time of making this application, pays the agent in cash the full amount
of the first premium for the insurance applied for . . . and so declares in
this application and receives from the agent a receipt therefor on the receipt
form which is attached hereto, and if the Company, after medical examination and investigation, shall be satisfied that the applicant %vas, at the time
of making this application, insurable and entitled under the Company's rules
and standards to the insurance on the plan and for the amount applied for
... then said insurance shall take effect and be in force under and subject
to the provisions of the policy applied for from and after the time this
application is made, whether the policy be delivered to and received by the
applicant or not." See Lueck v. New York Life Ins. Co., (1932) 185 Minn.
184, 34
240 N. W. 363.
The company may still reject the applicant as not an insurable risk,
provided it does so in the "proper" exercise of its rights; and in that event
the binding receipt is without effect. Reynolds v. Northwestern Mut. Life
Ins. Co., (1920) 189 Iowa 76, 176 N. W. 207. See also Chandler Bullock,
Binding Receipts, (Dec. 6, 1921) Paper No. 57, 1 Proceedings of Ass'n of
Life 35Insurance Counsel.
Joyce, Insurance, 2d ed., sec. 64. See also Coke, The Commencement
of the Risk in the Case of a Life Insurance Policy, (May 4, 1921) Paper
No. 51, 1 Proceedings of Ass'n of Life Insurance Counsel: "Under this
particular plan the applicant carries the risk until he gets his policy if he
has not paid his first premium, but if he has paid the premium, and it appears
that if the risk is a good one the Company carries it from the date of the
payment or the date of application or the date of approval as the case may
be, though the insured may be ill or even dead before the policy is actually
issued and delivered."
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before the Minnesota court.30 In the first case"1 presented, it was
held that there was no contract, because the premium was not paid
"in cash" as required by the application; but in two later decisions",
it was held that there might be substantial compliance with such
requirements, even though the prescribed procedure was not exactly
followed.
Terms of the Contract. Assuming that an agent, with sufficient authority, has made an effective contract of insurance prior
to the issuance of the policy, what are the terms of the contract?
An oral agreement, whether accompanied by a binding slip or not,
of course contemplates a formal policy, and by implication includes
all the terms of that policy. The rights and liabilities of the parties
to such an informal contract are to be determined by the terms of
the policy expected. 9 Where nothing is said in the oral contract
about conditions, the parties are presumed to intend that it shall
contain the conditions usually inserted in policies of insurance in
like cases.4" The burden of showing that a particular term or
condition is usual rests upon the party who seeks to take advantage
of it.41 If a policy is in fact issued and delivered before any loss
occurs, and is retained by the insured without objection, the earlier
agreement is regarded as merged in the written policy, and parol
evidence cannot be introduced to vary its terms. The remedy in
such a case is a suit to reform the contract. 42 But if loss occurs
before delivery of the policy, the document actually delivered is not
conclusive as to the terms of the contract, and is at best only evi43
dence of what was intended.
86Cases involving binding receipts were distinguished in Olson v. AmeriLife Ins. Co., (1927) 172 Minn. 511, 216 N. W. 225.
can Central
37
Zemler v. New York Life Ins. Co., (1929) 177 Minn. 273, 225 N. W.
81. 38
Lueck v. New York Life Ins. Co., (1932) 185 Minn. 184, 240 N. W.
363 (relying upon New York Life Ins. Co. v. Abromietes (1931) 254 Mich.
622, 236 N. W. 679) ; Fortin v. New York Life Ins. Co., (1932) 185 Minn.
241 N. W. 673.
523, 39
40Vance, Handbook of the Law of Insurance, 2d ed., 182.
Salisbury v. Hekla Fire Ins. Co., (1884) 32 Minn. 458, 21 N. W. 552.
41
Salisbury v. Hekla Fire Ins. Co., (1884) 32 Minn. 458, 21 N. W. 552.
42
Lundman v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., (1925) 163 Minn.
303, 204 N. W. 159; see Salisbury v. Hekla Fire Ins. Co., (1884) 32 Minn.
458, 21 N. W. 552.
43
"The written policy made out by the defendant after the fire, of
course, cannot be conclusive. Indeed, having been made after the liability
accrued, it would be no evidence of the contract at all, were it not for its
delivery to and retention by plaintiffs. Such delivery and retention may be
taken as an admission by plaintiffs that it set forth the terms of the contract
as agreed on, which might be rebutted by proof of what the contract
actually was." Salisbury v. Hekla Fire Ins. Co., (1884) 32 Minn. 458, 21
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Numerous cases 44 in other jurisdictions have held that there
can be no effective contract of insurance unless the minds of the
parties have met as to all of the essential terms of the contract,
including the subject-matter to be insured, the amount of the insurance, the risk covered, the duration of the contract, and the premiums to be paid. But the courts have shown a tendency to be very
liberal in finding that there has been implied agreement upon certain essential terms, such as the premium rate, the time of payment,
and the duration of the risk.45 The Minnesota decisions are not
very clear, but there are indications of a similar tendency in this
state.4 6
In Minnesota, as in many other states, statutory provisions have
been enacted setting out standard forms for insurance policies. The
use of the standard fire insurance form 47 is compulsory, and there
are compulsory clauses which must be inserted in all policies of
life4 ' and accident and health 9 insurance. The constitutionality of
these statutes has been upheld. 0 Where such compulsory forms
N. W. 552; Ganser v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., (1885) 34 Minn. 372, 25
N. W.
44 943.
The cases are collected in notes in 15 A. L. R. 995 and 69 A. L. R.
559.

See for example Whitman v. Milwaukee Fire Ins. Co., (1906)

128

Wis. 124, 107 N. W. 291, 5 L. R. A. (N.S.) 407, 116 Am. St. Rep. 25.
45See Aetna Ins. Co. v. Licking Valley Milling Co., (C.C.A. 6th Cir.
1927) 19 F. (2d) 177 (premium rate, time of payment, duration of risk and
name of company); J.C. Smith & Wallace Co. v. Prussian Nat'l Ins. Co.,
(1903) 68 N. J.L. 674, 54 Ad. 458 (premium rate); Cleveland Oil Co. v.
Norwich Ins. Soc., (1898) 34 Or. 228, 55 Pac. 435 (same) ; British Amer.
Ins. Co. v. Wilson, (1905) 77 Conn. 559, 60 Atl. 293 (same) ; Schroeder v.
Trade
Ins. Co., (1883) 109 Ill.
157 (duration of risk).
46
1n Ames-Brooks Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., (1901) 83 Minn. 346, 86 N. W.
344, the defendant was held liable for breach of an agreement to write
insurance on all of plaintiff's grain cargoes in 1899 "at the same rates" as
in 1898. The court regarded the property to be insured, the amount of insurance, and the premium rates as easily determinable. In Russell v. O'Connor, (1912) 120 Minn.66, 139 N. W. 148, the action was against an insurance agent for breach of a contract to obtain insurance upon plaintiff's
building. The case was disposed of on other grounds, but the court said
that failure to agree upon the premiums did not prevent the existence of a
contract, since there was "an implied obligation on the plaintiff's part, to
pay the premium if the policy had been written." See also Backus v. Ames,
(1900) 79 Minn. 145, 81 N. W. 766; Eifert v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., (1921)
148 Minn.
17, 180 N. W. 996.
47
Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat. sec. 3512.
4
sMason's 1927 Minn. Stat secs. 3399, 3402. Either the policy forms set
out in sec. 3399 or the provisions in sec. 3402 must be used. See Reagan v.
Philadelphia Life Ins. Co., (1925) 165 Minn. 186, 206 N. W. 162.
49Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat. sec. 3417.
5OThe first Minnesota standard fire insurance policy act was held unconstitutional in Anderson v. Manchester Fire Assur. Co., (1894) 59 Minn.
182, 60 N. W. 1095, 64 N. W. 241, upon the ground that it delegated to the
state insurance commissioner the power to prescribe forms. In 1895 the
legislature adopted the Massachusetts form of standard policy, with minor
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are prescribed, any material 5' variation from the form is illegal;52
and if a policy is issued containing any such clause, the clause is
ineffective, and the rights of all parties concerned are to be determined on the basis of the statutory provisions.53 Apparently there
is nothing in the Minnesota standard policy statutes 4 to prevent
an oral contract of insurance;" but it seems clear that any such
changes. The constitutionality of the compulsory arbitration provision of
this statute has been upheld. Itasca Paper Co. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co.,
(1928) 175 Minn. 73, 220 N. W. 425; Glidden Co. v. Retail Hardware Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., (1930) 181 Minn. 518, 233 N. W. 310 (discussed in (1931) 15
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 708); Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v.
Glidden Co., (1931) 284 U. S. 151, 52 Sup. Ct. 69, 76 L. Ed. 214. For the
history of standard policy legislation, see Patterson, Administrative Control
of Insurance Policy Forms, (1925) 25 Col. L. Rev. 253.
,"The statute does not prohibit a company from printing in or attaching to the policy terms or conditions not found in the standard form, provided they are not inconsistent with or a waiver of any of the provisions of
such forms. So far as the conditions and provisions of the form go, they
are controlling, and may not be omitted, changed or waived, though provisions not conflicting with them may be added when necessary to express the
terms of a contract of insurance which is authorized by the statute." Heil
v. American Alliance Ins. Co., (1920) 147 Minn. 283, 180 N. W. 225.
In Unton v. Liverpool, London & Globe Ins. Co., (1926) 166 Minn. 273.
207 N. W. 625, it was held that the standard fire insurance policy statute did
not prevent the issuance of a valued policy covering a leasehold interest.
52Wild Rice Lumber Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., (1906) 99 Minn. 190, 108
N. W. 871; Heim v. American Alliance Ins. Co., (1920) 147 Minn. 283,
180 N. W. 225; Brecher Furniture Co. v. Firemen's Ins. Co., (1923) 154
Minn. 446, 191 N. W. 912. Following these decisions, the standard fire
insurance policy statute was amended to permit insertion of tile provisions
held invalid. Minn. Laws 1909, ch. 331; Minn. Laws 1923, ch. 410.
53Aaberg v. Minnesota Commercial Men's Ass'n, (1919) 143 Minn.
354, 173 N. W. 708.
It has been held that the insurance company may waive standard policy
provisions which are for its benefit. Moore v. Sun Ins. Office, (1907) 100
Minn. 374, 111 N. W. 260; Kearns v. North Amer. Life & Cas. Co., (1921)
150 Minn. 486, 185 N. W. 659; see Lake Superior Produce Co. v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co., (1905) 85 Minn. 492, 104 N. W. 560.
In Kollitz v. Equitable Mut. Fire Ins. Co., (1904) 92 Minn. 234, 99
N. W. 892, it was held that the standard policy must be construed by the
same rules as contracts voluntarily entered into-that is to say, strictly
against the insurer.
"4Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat. secs. 3402, 3417, 3512.
",In Salquist v. Oregon Fire Relief Ass'n, (1921) 100 Or. 416, 192 Pac.
312, and Munhall v. Travelers Ins. Co., (1930) 300 Pa. St. 327, 150 Atd.
645, it was held that the effect of a standard policy statute was to make oral
contracts of insurance impossible. The Oregon decision is criticized in
(1927) 6 Oregon L. Rev. 172. In other states it has been held that the
effect of the statute is not to invalidate oral contracts, but merely to provide
compulsory terms which become a part of such contracts. Lea v. Atlantic
Fire Ins. Co., (1915) 168 N. C. 478, 84 S. E. 813; National Liberty Ins.
Co. v. Milligan, (,C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1926) 10 F. (2d) 483; Robertson v.
Burstein, (1928) 104 N. J. L. 218, 141 Atd. 92 (reversed on other grounds
105 N. J. L. 375, 146 Atl. 355); Milwaukee Bedding Co. v. Graebner,
(1923) 182 Wis. 171, 196 N. W. 533. Apparently the question never has
been presented in Minnesota; but in view of the decision in Koivisto v.
Bankers & Merchants Fire Ins. Co., (1921) 148 Minn. 255, 181 N. W. 580,
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oral contract necessarily must incorporate the compulsory provi sions of the statute. 6
Instead of making a present oral contract of insurance, the
agent may agree on behalf of his company to an executory contract
to insure. An agent who has authority to make a present contract
may, within that authority, make a contract to insure in the
future.17 The distinction is an important one, which sometimes is
overlooked." Under an executory contract to insure, the insurance
company is obligated to deliver a policy and complete a contract of
insurance within a designated time, or within a reasonable time if
no time is specified.5 9 If the policy is not delivered, the applicant
may maintain a suit for specific performance0O or an action for
damages.61 If a loss occurs after the insurance should have become
effective, the measure of damages is the loss sustained, up to the
amount for which it was agreed that the insurance was to be written.6 2 The right of action arises out of the breach of the contract
to insure, and not out of any contract of insuranceY. 3 Consequently,
the statute of limitations will run from the date when the policy
64
should have been issued.
2.

ACCEPTANCE OF THE APPLICATION, AND DELIVERY OF THE

POLICY
In the usual case, the soliciting agent who takes the application
is without authority, actual or apparent, to complete the contract.
recognizing an oral contract which clearly was within the standard fire
insurance policy statute, it may be expected that our court will follow the
cases 6last cited.
5 Hicks v. British Amer. Assur. Co., (1900) 162 N. Y. 284, 56 N. E.
743, 48 L. R. A. 424; Lea v. Atlantic Fire Ins. Co., (1915) 168 N. C. 478, 84
S. E.57 813.
Eifert v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., (1921) 148 Minn. 17, 180 N. W.
996. 5
sSee for example the pleading difficulties in Stewart v. St. Paul Fire
Ins. Co., (1927) 171 Minn. 363, 214 N. W. 58.
& Marine
5
9Vance, Handbook of the Law of Insurance, 2d ed., 184.
6
oSee Quinn-Shepherdson Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,
(1919) 142 Minn. 428, 172 N. W. 693. In Tayloe v. Merchants Ins. Co.,
(1850) 9 How. (U.S.) 390, 13 L. Ed. 187, specific performance .was granted
even after loss had occurred. The court said that the remedy at law was
and difficult, and therefore inadequate.
troublesome
6
'Eifert v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., (1921) 148 Mdinn. 17, 180 N. W.
996; Ames-Brooks Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., (1901) 83 Minn. 346, 86 N. W.
344. See Everett v. O'Leary, (1903) 90 Minn. 154, 95 N. W. 901; QuinnShepherdson Co. v. ,United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., (1919) 142
Minn.
62 428, 172 N. W. 693.
See Everett v. O'Leary, (1903) 90 Minn. 154, 95 N. W. 901. Quaere,
as to the duty of the plaintiff, after a reasonable time, to minimize damages 6by
reasonable efforts to obtain other insurance?
3
See Everett v. O'Leary, (1903) 90 Minn. 154, 95 N. W. 901.
6
4See Everett v. O'Leary, (1903) 90 3inn. 154, 95 N. W. 901.
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He is authorized merely to transmit the application to the home
office of the company, for its acceptance or rejection. The application is then merely an offer to contract. It stands upon the same
footing as an order taken by any other salesman, for so many
boxes of crackers, shoes, or dried fish. Until the offer has been
accepted by the home office of the company, there is no contract."9
If a policy is issued which is not in accordance with the terms of
the application, it is a counter-offer, and there is still no contract,
until the new policy in turn has been accepted by the applicant.",
Since an offer creates no duty in the offeree to accept or to
reject,6 7 a mere failure on the part of the insurance company to act
on the application, no matter how long its silence and inaction may
be continued, does not amount to an acceptance, and creates no
contract liability. 68 The hardship upon the innocent applicant, who
has been led to forego attempts to obtain other insurance, if loss
occurs while the company unreasonably delays its decision on the
application, has induced a number of courts to evolve ingenious
theories69 of liability in such a case. It has been held that there is a
duty imposed upon an insurance company because of its public
character and its franchise from the state, requiring it to act
promptly upon all applications, rendering it liable in tort if it fails
65Heiman v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., (1871) 17 Minn. 153 (Gil.
127), 10 Am. Rep. 154; Schwartz v. Germania Life Ins. Co., (1872) 18
Minn. 448 (Gil. 404); Wales v. New York Bowery Fire Ins. Co., (1887) 37
Minn. 106, 33 N. W. 322. See Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Star Ins. Co.,
(1929) 178 Minn. 526, 227 N. W. 850; Patterson, The Delivery of a Life
Insurance
Policy, (1919) 33 Harv. L. Rev. 198.
66
Wales v. New York Bowery Fire Ins. Co., (1887) 37 Minn. 106, 33 N.
W. 322. In Wadsworth v. Walsh, (1915) 128 Minn. 241, 150 N. W. 870,
the application was accompanied by a note, which gave the applicant the
option to increase or decrease the insurance on the first payment. There
was no showing that the option ever was exercised. It was held that the
issuance and delivery of a policy in accordance with the application was
sufficient consideration for the note.
The insurance agent may be authorized to accept a policy issued on
behalf of the insured. Hamm Realty Co. v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co.,
(1900) 80 Minn. 139, 83 N. W. 41; Ames v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
(1922)
67 154 Minn. 111, 191 N. W. 274.
Corbin, Offer and Acceptance and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations,68 (1919) 26 Yale L. J. 171.
Heiman v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., (1871) 17 Minn. 153 (Gil.
127), 10 Am. Rep. 154. See also footnote 74.
69
The various theories of liability are discussed in length in Funk, The
Duty of an Insurer to Act Promptly on Applications, (1927) 75 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 207; Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy, (1919) 33
Harv. L. Rev. 198; Notes in (1921) 15 A. L. R. 1026; (1923) 27 A. L. R.
463; (1920) 33 Harv. L. Rev. 595; (1920) 29 Yale L. J. 673; (1930) 40
Yale L. '. 121; see also (1918) 3 MINNESOTA LAw REviEW 53; (1921) 5
MINNESOTA LAW REvIEw 224; (1921)
5 MINNESOTA LAW Rviw 479;
(1922) 6 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEw 596; (1931) 15 MINNESOTA LAW R,viEw 833.
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to accept or reject a normally acceptable application within a reasonable time.70 Other decisions have proceeded upon the theory
of a duty owed by the insurance agent to the applicant to forward
the application promptly ;"' still others have spoken rather vaguely
of estoppel 2 or of quasi-contract, 3 or have said that "silence is
acceptance." 74 A small but vigorous minority have refused to find
any liability at all.7 5 The number of jurisdictions which have decided in favor of tort liability for delay in acting on the application
make it clear that the insurance law of the country tends in this
direction.7 6 In nearly all of the cases in which such liability has
70
Boyer v. State Farmers' Mut. Hail Ins. Co., (1912) 86 Kan. 442, 121
Pac. 329; Duffle v. Bankers Life Ass'n, (1913) 160 Iowa 19, 139 N. V.
1087; Willin v. Capital Fire Ins. Co., (1916) 99 Neb. 828, 157 N. W. 1021;
Johnson v. Farmers Ins. Co., (1918) 184 Iowa 630, 168 N. W. 264; Security Ins. Co. v. Cameron, (1922) 85 Okla. 171, 205 Pac. 151; Columbian
Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Lemmons, (1923) 96 Okla. 228, 222 Pac. 255; Fox v.
Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., (1923) 185 N. C. 121, 126 S. E. 226; Dyer
v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., (1925) 132 Wash. 378, 232 Pac. 346.
71Carter
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,'(1897) 11 Hawaii 69.
72
Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. v. Stone, (1899) 61 Kan. 48, 58 Pac. 986;
Richmond v. Travelers Ins. Co., (1910) 123 Tenn. 307, 130 S.W. 790, 30
L. R. A. (N.S.) 954. The estoppel theory is rejected by Vance, Handbook
of the3 Law of Insurance, 2d ed., 188.
S7. See Kukuska v. Home Mut. Hail-Tornado Ins. Co., (1931) 204 Wis.
166, 74
235 N. W. 403.
Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. v. Stone, (1899) 61 Kan. 48, 58 Pac. 986;
Stearns v. Merchants' Life & Cas. Co., (1917) 38 N. D. 528, 165 N. W.
568; Great Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Dolan, (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) 239
S. W. 236, rev'd on rehearing (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) 262 S. V. 475. This
theory is supported by Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy,
(1919) 33 Harv. L. Rev. 198, 216, and by the note in (1925) 10 Corn. L. Q.
250. But the weight of authority is heavily against any contract liability in
such a case. Misselhorn v. Mutual Reserve Fund Ass'n, (C.C. Mo. 1887)
30 Fed. 545; Alabama Gold Life Ins. Co. v. Mayes, (1878) 61 Ala. 163;
Stewart v. Helvetia Swiss Fire Ins. Co., (1894) 102 Cal. 218, 36 Pac. 410;
Atkinson v. Hawkeye Ins. Co., (1887) 71 Iowa 340, 32 N. W. 371 ; Handlier
v. Knights of Columbus, (1921) 106 Neb. 267, 183 N. W. 302; fore v.
New York Bowery Fire Ins. Co., (1892) 130 N. Y. 527, 29 N. E. 757; Ross
v. New York Life Ins. Co., (1899) 124 N. C. 395, 32 S.E. 733; Dorman v.
Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., (1914) 41 Okla. 509, 137 Pac. 262; Royal Ins.
Co. v. Beatty, (1888) 119 Pa. 6, 12 Atl. 607; Northern Neck Mut. Fire
Ass'n5 v. Turlington, (1923) 136 Va. 44, 116 S.E. 363.
' National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. School Dist. No. 55, (1916) 122 Ark.
179, 182 S. W. 547; Interstate Business Men's Acc. Ass'n v. Nichols,
(1920) 143 Ark. 369, 220 S.W. 477; Savage v. Prudential Life Ins. Co.,
(1929) 154 Miss. 89, 121 So. 487. Cf. Bradley v. Federal Life Ins. Co.,
(1920) 295 Ill. 381, 127 N. E. 191. Insurance counsel of course have
attacked the majority rule with great vigor. See for example James C.
Jones, General Counsel American Nat'l Assur. Co., "Tort or No Tort,"
(1924) 2 Proceedings Ass'n of Life Ins. Counsel 389, 56 Chi. Leg. N. 366:
"It seems to me that the courts holding that a liability in tort arises from
delay in acting promptly on an application for insurance have not considered this fundamental question: Is there any such duty imposed by law?
If there
is not, there can be no liability in tort."
76 See cases cited in footnote 70. This tendency is justified by Funk,
The Duty of an Insurer to Act Promptly on an Application, (1927) 75
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been found there has been payment of the first premium in advance
at the time of the application,7 - and it may be that a differtnt result
will be reached if this is not the case.-, The Minnesota court has
given no indication of what it will do when these questions arise.7
The offer contained in the application may be accepted by any
act contemplated by the offer as an acceptance.80 It is of course
anticipated when the application is forwarded that the company
will first approve the application, then execute a formal policy and
forward it to the local agent, who will make the final deliver) to
the insured. At some point in this process the offer will be accepted, and the contract completed. In other states, there have been
various opinions as to the precise act which constitutes acceptance.
Some jurisdictions require an actual physical delivery of the policy
to the insured before the contract is in effect;" others consider
that the offer is accepted when the policy is received by the local
agent of the company;"'-' still others find a contract from the time
the policy is mailed from the home office to the agent ;" one or two
consider that the contract is complete when the policy is executed
U. Pa. L. Rev. 207, 222, as a necessary policy toward a quasi-public business.77
Note, (1930) 40 Yale L. J. 121, 126; (1931) 15 MtNN sorAr,l.Av
REviaw
833.
78
The distinction is made in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Brady, (Ind.
App. 1930) 171 N. E. 14.
79
In the case of .Schliep v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., District
Court of Minnesota, Seventh Judicial District, File No. 9929. tried April
1, 1933, Judge Anton Thompson permitted the question of defendant's tort
liability for failure to act on plaintiff's application to go to the jury, refusing to direct a verdict for defendant. The jury returned a verdict for
plaintiff, in the sum of $540. The writer is informed that a motion for
new trial is pending.
James C. Jones, "Tort or No Tort," (1924) 2 Proceedings Ass'n of
Life Ins. Counsel 389, 56 Chi. Leg. N. 366, suggests that the insurance company may protect itself against liability by a clause in the application providing that it shall have a certain number of days within which to consider the
application, after which, if the applicant has heard nothing, the offer shall
be considered as rejected. The effectiveness of such a provision seem%
doubtful. See Funk, The Duty of an Insurer to Act Promptly on an Application, (1927) 75 U. Pa. L. Rev. 207, 225.
8OIn Conley v. Modern Life Ins. Co., (1927) 172 Minn. 482, 215 N.
W. 836, acceptance was found from the fact that the company, with the
applicant's approval, had listed him as an accepted insured in an application to the insurance department for a charter.
81 Busher v. New York Life Ins. Co., (1904) 72 N. H. 551, 58 Atl.
41; Horton v. New York Life Ins. Co., (1899) 151 Mo. 604, 52 S. W.
356. 87
See Gallagher v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., (1910) 67 Misc. Rep.
115, 121 N. Y. S. 638.
8
3Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Farmer, (1898) 65 Ark. 581, 47
S. W. 850; Rose v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., (1909) 240 I1. 45, 88 N. E. 2104.
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by the officials of the company at the home office,' or even when
the application is marked "approved." 8 5 Minnesota has determined
the question quite definitely. In the absence of some controlling
condition in the application or the policy itself, the offer is accepted and the contract is complete when the policy is mailed by
the home office of the company to its agent, with no other authority
or duty than to deliver it to the insured. 6 It has been pointed
out0 7 that such a result represents a departure from the strict

principles of contract law, and an adoption of a more liberal view,
which finds an acceptance in any "significant act" or "niani festation
of intention," even though it is not communicated. Another possible explanation is the finding of a constructive delivery in any
act done with the intention of putting the policy beyond the coinpany's legal, if not physical, control, if the insured has acquiesced
in that intention. s
If, however, the policy is forwarded into the hands of the local
agent of the insurance company with instructions not to deliver
possession of it to the applicant until certain conditions have been
met-if, for example, the agent is directed to collect the first preiium, 9 or to assure himself that the applicant is in good health,"
before surrendering the policy-then it is apparent that the acceptance is a conditional one, and there is no "delivery" and no final
contract until the condition has been met"' or the policy surrendered.92 In many cases, therefore, the existence of the contract will
8

4Van Arsdale-Osborne Brokerage Co. v. Robertson, (1912) 36 Okla.
123, 128 Pac. 107; see Robinson v. United States Benevolent Soc., (1903) 132
Mich.5 695, 94 N. W. 211.
8 Kohen v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, (1886) 28 Fed. 705; see
Kentucky Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Jenks, (1854) 5 Ind. 96, 99.
86"It is very well settled that where nothing remains to be done by the
insured, the mailing of the policy duly executed to the insured or to an
agent of the company for delivery to the insured constitutes a delivery....
The contract is complete when the application is accepted, and the acceptance signified by mailing the policy." Kilborn v. Prudential Ins. Co.,
(1906) 99 Minn. 176, 108 N. W. 861; see Schwartz v. Germania Life Ins.
Co., (1875) 21 Minn. 215; cf. Martin v. Business Men's Assur. Co., (.\linn.
1933) 7 246 N. W. 882.
8 Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy, (1919) 33 Harv.
L. Rev. 198, 208, 214.
SSVance, Handbook of the Law of Insurance, 2d ed., p. 206 ft.
S9Heiman v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., (1871) 17 Minn. 153 (Gil.
127),9 10 Am. Rep. 154.
oSchwartz v. Germania Life Ins. Co., (1872) 18 Minn. 448 (Gil. 104 .
911n Schwartz v. Germania Life Ins. Co., (1875) 21 Minn. 215, it was
held that if the policy was forwarded to the agent with no other authority
or duty than simply to deliver the policy on payment of the first premium,
acceptance was conditional upon such payment alone, and tender of payment92satisfied the condition and completed the contract.
The principle is clearly illustrated by the two decisions in Schwartz
v. Germania Life Ins. Co., (1872) 18 Minn. 448 (Gil. 404); Schwartz %'.
Germania Life Ins. Co., (1875) 21 Minn. 215.
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turn upon the directions with which the policy is forwarded by
the company to its agent.
3. THE EFFECT OF CONDITIONS IN THE APPLICATION OR POLICY

The rule that the contract is completed when the policy is
mailed from the home office exposes the insurance company to the
possibility of loss, or of some change in the risk, before the policy
can be handed over to the insured and the first premium collected.
Most companies9" have endeavored to meet this situation by inserting in the application, or in the policy issued, provisions intended
to delay the assumption of the risk until the policy reaches the
applicant. Such a provision in the application becomes a condition of the offer, which prescribes the mode of acceptance, and no
risk is assumed until the condition is satisfied."' In the policy, the
provision still makes the acceptance conditional, and the company
is not liable until its terms have been complied with." The common
provisions are the following:

Delivery to the Applicant. A provision that the insurance
shall not take effect until the policy has been delivered to the applicant obviously is intended to mean that the company shall not be
93

1n 1905 L. G. Fouse, president of a life insurance company, declared
that all of 51 representative companies inserted provisions that the policies
should not take effect until they were delivered during the lifetime and
good health of the applicant, with actual payment of the first premium. 26
Annals Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 209, 220, Yale Readings in Insurance (1909)
207, 219. In 1921 John A. Coke, Jr., attorney for the Life Insurance Co.
of Virginia, reported that out of 125 applications and policies examined,
87 required both delivery in good health and payment of the first premium
as conditions precedent to the commencement of the risk. The Commencement of the Risk in the Case of a Life Insurance Policy, (May 4, 1921)
Paper
94 No. 51, 1 Proceedings of Ass'n of Life Insurance Counsel.
See Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy, (1919) 33
Harv. L. Rev. 198, 219. Some courts consider that the provision is a condition precedent to the existence of a contract. Yount v. Prudential Life
Ins. Co., (Mo. App. 1915) 179 S. W. 749. Others have considered that the
contract may be completed in the form of a contract to insure, but the
risk does not attach until the condition is satisfied. Snedeker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., (1914) 160 Ky. 119, 169 S. W. 570; McClave v.
Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, (1893) 55 N. J. L. 187, 26 Atl. 78; Ray v.
Security Trust & Life Ins. Co., (1900) 126 N. C. 166, 35 S. E. 246. The
distinction, if it exists, is of importance chiefly in connection with waiver
of the provision by the insurance company and changes in the risk which
may occur between the completion of the contract and the attachment of
the risk. The Minnesota court has made no suggestion of any such distinction, unless it be in Ames v. New York Life Ins. Co., (1922) 154 Minn.
111, 191 N. W. 274, a very ambiguous case. See (1923) 7 MINNESOTA
LAW REVIEW 419.
95
Wilkins v. State Ins. Co., (1890) 43 Minn. 177, 45 N. W. 1; Straiback v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co., (1905) 94 Minn. 281, 102 N. W. 731.
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liable for losses occurring before the policy is physically transferred
into his hands. It has been given this interpretation by many
courts.96 But other jurisdictions have nullified completely the effect
of such stipulations by holding that delivery to the applicant is
satisfied by the constructive delivery involved in forwarding the
policy to the insurance agent. 9 Even a clause providing for "actual
delivery" ' to the applicant, or that the policy shall be "delivered to
and received by" him99 has received the same artificial construction.
There are indications 00 that the Minnesota court is inclined toward
such an interpretation of these clauses.
Payment of the First Premium.

It commonly is provided

that the insurance shall not take effect until the first premium has
been paid. Such a clause is legitimate' and will be given full
effect; until the initial payment has been made, the company is not
liable for any loss that may occur. 102 As soon as payment is made,
96Snedeker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., (1914) 160 Ky. 119, 169 S. W.
570; Bowen v. Prudential Ins. Co., (1913) 178 Mich. 63, 144 N. W. 543;
Yount v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., (Mo. App. 1915) 179 S. W. 749; McClave
v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, (1893) 55 N. J. L. 187, 26 At. 78;
Oliver v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., (1899) 97 Va. 134, 33 S. E. 536; McCully's
Adm'r v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., (1881) 18 W. Va. 782; Chamberlain v.
97 Prudential Ins. Co., (1901) 109 Wis. 4, 85 N. W. 128.
Triple Link Indemnity Ass'n v. Williams, (1898) 121 Ala. 138, 26
So. 19; Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Farmer, (1898) 65 Ark. 581,
47 S. W. 850; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Greenlee, (1908) 42 Ind. App.
82, 84 N. E. 1101; Unterharnscheidt v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., (1913)
160 Iowa 223, 138 N. W. 459; Gallagher v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
(1910) 67 Misc. Rep. 115, 121 N. Y. S. 638; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Shively,
(1913) 1 Ohio App. 238; see Preferred Ace. Ins. Co. v. Stone, (1899) 61
Kan. 48, 58 Pac. 986; Powell v. North State Mut. Life Ins. Co., (1910)
153 N.
C. 124, 69 S. E. 12.
9
sMutual Life Ins. Co. v. Otto, (1927) 153 Md. 179, 138 Atl. 16.
99
jackson v. New York Life Ins. Co., (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1925) 7 F.
(2d) 31; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Rutherford, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1922)
284 Fed.
707.
' 0oSee Kilborn v. Prudential Ins. Co., (1906) 99 Minn. 176, 108 N. W.
861 (holding that mailing the policy to the agent is a "delivery") ; Ikenberry v. New York Life Ins. Co., (1914) 127 Minn. 215, 149 N. W. 292
(permitting the jury to find that the policy had taken effect, on the basis
of written admissions of the agent, notwithstanding a provision in the application that the policy must be "delivered to and received by" the applicant).0
' 'Compare the cases involving delivery of the policy to the agent
with directions not to surrender it until the premium is paid. Heiman V.
Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., (1871) 17 Minn. 153 (Gil. 127), 10 Am. Rep.
154; Schwartz v. Germania Life Ins. Co., (1872) 18 Minn. 448 (Gil. 404);
see Hoidale v. Cooley, (1919) 143 Minn. 430, 174 N. W. 413.
lO2Wilklns v. State Ins. Co., (1890) 43 Minn. 177, 45 N. W. 1; Stramback v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co., (1905) 94 Minn. 281, 10- N. W. 731:
Sawyer v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., (1926) 166 Minn. 207, 207 N. W. 307;
Olson v. American Central Life Ins. Co., (1927) 172 Minn. 511, 216 N. W.
225; Zemler v. New York Life Ins. Co., (1929) 177 Minn. 273, 225 N. W.
81; Allen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., (1930) 177 Minn. 545, 229 N. W.
879.
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even though it be in advance, at the time of the application," 3 the
condition is satisfied, and the acceptance of the offer takes effect in
the usual manner.
The Minnesota decisions have been concerned chiefly with the
question whether there has been payment. The company may, if it
chooses, insist upon payment of the premium in cash, before the
insurance is to take effect ;104 but, since the provision is for the
benefit of the company, it may accept payment in some other form
if it sees fit. If the home office of the company, with knowledge
that one of its agents has taken a promissory note' or a postdated check01 n in payment, issues a policy and forwards it to the
agent for delivery to the applicant, it must be taken to have accepted that particular form of payment as sufficient and to have delivered the policy with the intention that it shall take effect. A subsequent default on the note will not avoid the policy.'07 The authority of the agent to accept such a substitute for payment without
consulting the home office presents greater difficulty. It is of
course clear that if the agent in the past has made a practice of
taking notes in payment, with the knowledge and approval of the
company, 0 1 he will have apparent, if not actual, authority to do so
in a particular case. 109 But in Kilborn v. Prudential Ins. Co.," 0 a
case which has become widely known, the Minnesota court went
much further, holding that a soliciting agent of a foreign insurance
company, authorized by virtue of our statute"' to collect premiums,
has as a matter of law apparent authority to extend the credit of
the company by taking the note of the insured for the first payment. 1"
' 0 3Kilborn v. Prudential Ins. Co., (1906) 99 Minn. 176, 108 N. W.
861. Cf. Schwartz v. Germania Life Ins. Co., (1875) 21 Minn. 215 (tender
sufficient).
of payment
' 04 Sawyer v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., (1926) 166 Minn. 207, 207 N. W.
307; Zemler v. New York Life Ins. Co., (1929) 177 Minn. 273, 225 N. W.
81; Allen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., (1930) 179 Minn. 545, 229 N. W.
879.
ol.Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Taggart, (1893) 55 Minn. 95, 56
N. W. 579, 43 Am. St. Rep. 474. Cf. Hoidale v. Cooley, (1919) 143 Minn.
N. W. 413.
430, 174
' 007
°Martin v. Business Men's Assur. Co.. (Minn. 1933) 246 N. W. 882.
' Coughlin v. Reliance Life Ins. Co., (1925) 161 Minn. 446, 201 N. W.
920.
l0Sf the company has not known of the agent's practice, there can be
no apparent authority. Jackson v. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co., (1900) 79
Minn. 43, 81 N. W. 545.
0""Godfrey v. New York Life Ins. Co., (1897) 70 Minn. 224, 73 N.
W. 1.
110(1906) 99 Minn. 176, 108 N. W. 861.
"'Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat. sec. 3757.
"12"A person of ordinary prudence and knowledge of the usages of the
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This decision, which is in line with the weight of authority,113 is

limited by other Minnesota cases. The apparent authority does not
protect the applicant where the note is given to the agent in his personal capacity, rather than as agent of the company,' 1 4 or where it
is agreed that the premium is to be applied on the agent's personal
debt.115 Nor does it protect him where it is not understood and
intended that the note is to be accepted in lieu of payment,' or
where it is fully explained to the applicant that the company will
not accept notes in place of cash. 1 17 Insurance companies generally
protect themselves on this basis by inserting in the application a
clause providing that the agent is not authorized to accept anything
but money. Such a provision in the application will serve as
notice to the applicant, and will prevent any apparent authority to
extend credit,' at least where the company has not made a prac9
tice of ignoring it.Y
But a similar clause in the policy issued can
have no effect unless the applicant has seen the policy prior to the
time he makes the payment.2 life insurance business, who is solicited by an agent who has authority to
collect the first premium, may fairly and reasonably rely upon the assertion of the agent that he has authority to give a short credit for the first
premium. Especially is this true when the application which he signs does
not state that the first premium is to be paid in cash. It is a matter of
common knowledge that this is one of the methods by which such agents
procure business. The applicant has the right to believe that the insurance
company will not send to him an agent who will assume authority which
he does not properly possess, and thus lead him to believe that lie is
insured when he is not insured. The company selects its agents, and cannot be permitted to throw the entire responsibility for their misconduct
upon a person who deals with them in good faith." Elliott, J. in Kilborn
v. Prudential Ins. Co., (1906) 99 Minn. 176, 185, 108 N. W. 861.
See also Ikenberry v. New York Life Ins. Co., (1914) 127 Minn.
215, 149 N. XV. 292, holding that acceptance of a note in payment was for
the jury.
"13Tayloe v. Merchants Fire Ins. Co., (1850) 9 How. (U.S.) 390, 13
L. Ed. 187; Mississippi Valley Life Ins. Co. v. Neyland, (1873) 9 Bush
(Ky.) 430; Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Colt, (1874) 20 Wall. (U.S.) 560.
22 L. Ed. 423; Baker v. Commercial Assur. Co., (1894) 162 Mass. 358. 38
N. E. 1124; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Benjamin Douglas Co., (1917) 198 Mich.
457. 164 N. W. 469. See 2 Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law, sec. 537,
p. 1645.4
"1 Jackson v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., (1900) 79 Minn. 43, 81
N. W.5 545.
"1 Allen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., (1930) 179 Minn. 545, 229 N.
W. 879.
16 Sawyer v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., (1926) 166 Minn. 207, 207 N. W.
307. 1
"Zemler v. New York Life Ins. Co., (1929) 177 Minn. 273, 225
N. W. 81.
"sWilkins v. State Ins. Co., (1890) 43 Minn. 177, 45 N. W. 1 (clause
in policy, delivered to applicant at the time agent extended credit).
119Cf. Godfrey v. New York Life Ins. Co., (1897) 70 Minn. 224, 73
N. IV. 1.
l2OKilborn v. Prudential Ins. Co., (1906) 99 Minn. 176, 108 N. V. 861.
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In the absence of a condition in the application or the policy
requiring payment of the first premium before the insurance takes
effect, a surrender of the policy to the insured will be taken to indicate an extension of credit and an intention that the policy shall
go into effect at once.' 21 But if there is such a condition, not even
delivery of the policy to the applicant will make the insurance effective, unless the premium has been paid, or payment waived by an
authorized agent."22 Possession of the policy by the insured, however, creates a presumption 23 that the contract is complete"24 and
that payment has been made or the time extended.
A particularly puzzling Minnesota case is Ames v. New York
Life Ins. Co. 125 The applicant, age 40, applied for a policy through
a soliciting agent named Jennings. He agreed that if the company
should be unwilling to issue a policy at the premium rate corresponding to his age, the application should be for a policy at a rate
corresponding to the company's valuation of the risk. By the
terms of the application, the insurance was not to take effect
unless the first premium was paid and the policy delivered during
his lifetime. The company rated the risk at age 49. and executed a
policy on that basis. The policy was forwarded through the company's branch office, but before it was turned over to the agent
Jennings, and before any premium was paid, the applicant became
seriously ill. In ignorance of the illness, the branch office sent the
policy to Jennings, and received a check for the first premium.
The applicant died; and upon suit by the beneficiary of the policy
the company contended that failure to disclose the change in
physical condition between the date of the application and the (late
of delivery to Jennings avoided the policy. The opinion first
decides that the contract was complete when Jennings accepted the
policy on behalf of the applicant, apparently on the theory that the
12lKollitz v. Equitable Mut. Fire Ins. Co., (1904) 92 Minn. 234, 99
N. W. 892.
1""Where an insurance policy provides that it shall not be effective
until the first premium is paid, it does not take effect even although delivered until this provision is complied with." Kilborn v. Prudential Ins.
Co., (1906) 99 Minn. 176, 108 N. W. 861; see Sawyer v. Mutual Life Ins.
Co., (1926) 166 Minn. 207, 207 N. W. 307.
"3The presumption is rebuttable. Reagan v. Philadelphia Life Ins.
Co., (1925) 165 Minn. 186, 206 N. W. 162. The court leaves open the
question whether, if the policy recites that the premium has been paid, the
acknowledgment is conclusive in so far as it is necessary to fix the liability
of the4 insurer.

" Gardner v. United Surety Co., (1910) 110 Minn. 291, 125 N. W.
464; see Reagan v. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co., (1925) 165 Minn. 186, 206
N. W. 162.
125(1922) 154 Minn. 111, 191 N. W. 274.
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policy was a counter-offer requiring acceptance.', It then proceeds

to decide that there was no duty on the part of the applicant to
disclose the change in his health, apparently upon the theory that
the contract was complete when the policy was sent from the home
office to an agent who had no authority except to deliver on payment of the premium.1

27

The effect of the payment-of-premium

clause is not directly discussed. There would seem to be conflicting
elements in the decision which cannot be reconciled. 25
Good Health of the Applicant. Another common provision
is that the insurance shall not take effect unless upon a given date,
usually that of delivery of the policy, the applicant is in good
health. 129 Such a condition has been considered in only two Minnesota cases,13 in both of which it was enforced. Some courts have
26

1 "It

was within the scope of Jennings' authority to accept the policy
offered. He says he accepted it when he received it. If he did, there was
a completed contract, subject only to the condition that the first premium
should be paid in the lifetime of the applicant, and Jennings' acceptance

obligated the applicant to pay it. A contract may be formed by accepting a
paper containing terms."

Ames v. New York Life Ins. Co., (1922)

154

Minn.
27 111, 114, 191 N. W. 274.

' "Unlike most of the cases in which the doctrine has been asserted,
the negotiations between the parties were no longer pending, and no deception was practiced to get possession of the policy." Ames v. New York Life

Ins. 1Co.,
(1922) 154 Minr. 111, 117, 191 N. W. 274.
2

8The case might be interpreted as standing for any of the following
propositions:
1. The contract was completed by the acceptance of a counter-offer
contained in the policy, by the agent on behalf of the applicant. If this
is the decision, the second half of the opinion is incomprehensible.
2. There is no duty to disclose a change in health occurring before
the contract is complete. This is contrary to the great weight of authority.
Vance, Handbook of the Law of Insurance, 2d ed., p. 351; (1928) 14
Corn. L. Q. 91. The opinion cites Schwartz v. Germania Life Ins. Co.,
(1872) 18 Minn. 448 (Gil. 404) as opposed to the majority.
3. The insurance took effect when the policy was forwarded from the
home office. This would ignore entirely the provision in the application.
4. The contract was complete as a contract to insure when the policy
-as forwarded, but the risk did not attach until the premium w%-aspaid.
See footnote 94. This is perhaps the most plausible interpretation. See
(1923) 7 M iN SrrA LAw REVmw 419; Vance, Handbook of the Law
of Insurance, 2d ed., 352. But the opinion is by no means clear to this effect;
and it is submitted that such a result is contrary to the plain intention of
the company, that it shall not in any way be bound until the first premium
is paid. The case is criticized on this ground in (1923) 36 Harv. L. Rev.
884. 29
' See footnote 93. In Zemler v. New York Life Ins. Co., (1929) 177
Minn. 273, 225 N. W. 81, the provision took the form: the insurance 'shall
not take effect unless and until the policy is delivered to and received by
the applicant and the first premium therefor paid in full during his lifetime,
and then only if the applicant has not consulted or been treated by any
physician since his medical examination."
1
3OMurphy v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., (1908) 106 Minn. 112, 118 N. W.
355; Zemler v. New York Life Ins. Co., (1929) 177 Minn. 273, 225 N. W.
81. Cf. Schwartz v. Germania Life Ins. Co., (1872) 18 Minn. 448 (Gil.
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construed such a clause to apply only to changes in the applicant's
health during the interval between the (late of application and
delivery of the policy, and so allow recovery if his condition at
the time of delivery is no worse than when he made application.'
1 2
The weight of authority probably is to the contrary.
Truth of Statements in the Application. Almost invariably it is provided that the insurance shall not take effect, or that
the policy issued shall be void, if the statements made in the application are untrue. Any full discussion of the avoidance of the
contract by misstatements contained in the application is foreign to
the scope of this article."" Except in the case of fraternal insurance' 3 ' the matter now is governed entirely by statutes, which provide that the application shall not be considered as a warranty, or
as part of the contract, except in so far as it is incorporated in or
attached to the policy;'" and that no misrepresentation made by
the insured shall avoid the policy, or prevent its attaching, unless
made with intent to deceive or defraud, or unless the matter nisrepresented increases the risk of loss.13 0 Assuming, however, that
404). In Enge v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., (1931) 183 Minn. 117,
236 N. W. 207, the company was held estopped to set up such a provision,
because of its agent's misconduct in falsifying the application.
3
:1
Patterson, Cases on Insurance 490, citing: Fidelity Mut. Life In,;.
Co. v. Elmore, (1916) 111 Miss. 137, 71 So. 305; New York Life ns. Co.
v. Smith, (1922) 129 Miss. 544, 91 So. 456: Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Moore, (1904) 117 Ky. 651, 79 S. W. 219; Webster v. Columbian Nat'l
Life Ins. Co., (1909) 131 App. Div. 837, 116 N. Y. S. 404, aff'd in 196
N. Y.3 2523, 89 N. E. 1114.
1 Patterson, Cases on Insurance 490, citing: Barker v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., (1905) 188 Mass. 542, 74 N. E. 945; Logan v. New York
Life Ins. Co., (1919) 107 Wash. 253, 181 Pac. 906; Federal Life Ins. Co.,
v. Wright, (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) 230 S. W. 795; 14 R. C. L. 900; Note,
17 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1145.
33
1 See Vance, The History of the Development of the Warranty in
Insurance Law, (1910) 20 Yale L. J. 523; note, (1923) 71 ,U. Pa. L. Rev.
141; 3Vance,
Handbook of the Law of Insurance, 2d ed., 394, ff.
1 4 The statutes do not apply to fraternal insurance associations. Louden v. Modern Brotherhood of America, (1909) 107 Minn. 12, 119 N. W.
425; Farm v. Royal Neighbors of America, (1920) 145 Minn. 193, 176
N. W. 489.
13
5Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat. sec. 3334. The application does not protect the insurer unless it is incorporated or attached. Kollitz v. Equitable
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., (1904) 92 Minn. 234, 99 N. W. 892: Coleman v. Retail
Lumbermen's Ins. Ass'n, (1899) 77 Minn. 31, 79 N. W. 588; Pearson v.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., (1917) 138 Minn. 240, 164 N. W.
919. In Wheelock v. Home Life Ins. Co., (1911) 115 Minn. 177, 131
N. W. 1081, the court said that statements of the usual kind as to the history, habits or health of the applicant do not avoid, the policy unless the
application is attached, but suggested that the rule might be different as
to unusual representations inducing the insurer to contract.
13 OThe leading case interpreting this statute is Johnson v. National
Life Ins. Co., (1913) 123 Minn. 453, 144 N. W. 218. where Dibell, J.
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the misstatement is of such a character as to give the company the
right to avoid the policy, the Minnesota court has held that, regardless of the language used, the contract is voidable only, at the
election of the company ;137 and that the condition is a condition
subsequent, which does not prevent the completion of the contract,
or the attachment of the risk."s
4. THE EFFECT OF DELIVERY OF AN IMPROPER POLICY

A surprisingly large number of decisions have dealt with the
situation which arises where the policy delivered to the insured
does not in fact represent the true agreement of the parties. Upon
reading these cases, it is difficult to escape the conclusion, either
that insurance agents, as a class, have been astonishingly unreliable in their dealings with applicants, or that false testimony consistently has been brought before the courts in order to evade the
terms of the policy. Perhaps the truth lies somewhere between.
Two explanations commonly are advanced for the delivery of an
improper policy: mutual mistake, and misconduct of the insurance
agent. Two remedies customarily are invoked by the insured: the
divided misrepresentations into three classes: immaterial representations,
which do not avoid the policy even if made with intent to deceive; material
representations not increasing the risk of loss, which avoid the policy only
if made with a fraudulent intent; and representations which increase the
risk, which avoid the policy regardless of intent.
As to what representations are 'material" or "increase the risk of
loss," see (1931) 15 MImN-sorA LAw RvEmw 593; Reynolds v. Atlas Acc.
Ins. Co., (1897) 69 Minn. 93, 71 N. WN.831; Cerys v. State Ins. Co.,
(1898) 71 Minn. 338, 73 N. W. 849; Bruce v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins.
Co., (1898) 74 Minn. 310, 77 N. W. 210; Price v. Standard Life & Acc.
Ins. Co., (1903) 90 Minn. 264, 95 N. W. 1118; Mattson v. Modern Samaritans, (1904) 9.1 Minn. 434, 98 N. W. 330; Johnson v. National Life Ins.
Co., (1913) 123 Minn. 453, 144 N. W. 218; Silverstein v. Knights & Ladies
of Security, (1915) 129 Minn. 340, 152 N. W. 724; W. A. Thomas Co. v.
National Surety Co., (1919) 142 Minn. 460, 172 N. W. 697; Ivanesovich
v. North Amer. Life & Cas. Co., (1920) 145 Minn. 175, 176 N. W. 502;
Ames v. New York Life Ins. Co., (1922) 154 Minn. 111, 191 N. W. 274;
First Nat'l Bank v. National Liberty Ins. Co., (1923) 156 Minn. 1, 194
N. W. 6; Shaughnessy v. New York Life Ins. Co., (1925) 163 Minn. 134,
203 N. W. 600; Flikeid v. New York Life Ins. Co., (1925) 163 Minn. 127,
203 N. W. 598; McLevis v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., (1926) 165
Minn. 468, 206 N. W. 940; Mack v. Pacific Mut Life Ins. Co., (1926) 167
Minn. 53, 208 N. W. 410; Whitcomb v. Automobile Ins. Co., (1926) 167
Minn. 362, 209 N. W. 27; Schmitt v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co., (1926) 169 Minn. 106, 210 N. W. 846; Laury v. Northwestern Mut.
Life Ins. Co., (1930) 180 Minn. 205, 230 N. W. 648, 231 N. W. 824.
137 Schreiber v. German-American Hail Ins. Co., (1890) 43 Minn. 367,
45 N. W. 708.
13 8Chambers v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., (1896) 64 Minn. 495,
67 N. W. 367.
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reformation, in equity, of the policy, and the application, at law,
of the doctrine of waiver, or more properly, estoppel.
When a written policy is delivered to the insured, before any
loss occurs,' 39 and he accepts and retains it, it becomes his contract. His retention renders him liable for the premiums."" All
previous negotiations and oral agreements are regarded as merged
in the written contract, and no action may be brought upon any
such agreement, without first reforming the instrument.'" It is
an elementary principle of contract law that one who accepts and
retains a written instrument with the understanding that it represents his contract is charged with notice of its contents, and bound
2
by its terms, and will not be heard to say that he has not read it.'
Accordingly, so long as there has been no mistake on the part of
the insurance company, and its conduct has not in any way misled
the insured in his acceptance of the policy, it is immaterial, whether
the action be at law 14 . or in equity,144 that he did not read it. And
he may not introduce parol evidence to vary its terms.'4"
However necessary the conclusive presumption that the instrument has been read may be to the stability of contracts, it obviously
is a fiction in the case of insurance policies, since it is common
knowledge that the average man does not read his insurance policy,1 46 and very probably could not recognize its defects without
"39If loss occurs before delivery, the policy delivered is only evidence
of the contract, which may be rebutted. Salisbury v. Hekla Fire Ins. Co.,
(1884) 32 Minn. 458, 21 N. W. 552; Ganser v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co.,
(1885)4 0 34 Minn. 372, 25 N. W. 943.
1 Adams v. Eidam, (1889) 42 Minn. 53, 43 N. W. 690.
141Collins v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.. (1890) 44 Minn. 440,
46 N. W. 906; Lundman v. United States Fidelity & Casualty Co., (1925)
163 Minn. 303, 204 N. W. 159.
14-American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Contracts, sec.
70: "One who makes a written offer which is accepted, or (vho manifests
acceptance of the terms of a writing which he should reasonably understand to be an offer or proposed contract, is bound by the contract, though
ignorant of the terms of the writing, or of its proper interpretation."
14Wilkins v. State Ins. Co., (1890) 43 Minn. 177, 45 N. W. 1; Parsons, Rich & Co. v. Lane, (1906) 97 Minn. 98, 106 N. W. 485, 4 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 231; cf. Reynolds v. Atlas Accident Ins. Co., (1897) 69 Minn. 93,
71 N. W. 831.
144Guernsey v. American Ins. Co., (1871)
17 Minn. 104 (Gil. 83)
McFarland v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., (1891) 46 Minn. 519, 49
N. W. 253.
14'Frost's Detroit Lumber Works v. Miller's Mut. Ins. Co., (1887) 37
Minn. 300, 34 N. W. 35, 5 Am. St. Rep. 846; Calmenson v. Equitable Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., (1904) 92 Minn. 390, 100 N. W. 88; Lundman v. United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., (1925) 163 Minn. 303, 204 N. W. 159;
cf. Wadsworth v. Walsh, (1915) 128 Minn. 241, 150 N. W. 870.
'46"The insured buys 'protection' very much as he would any other
commodity. Indeed, in business life, he no more thinks of examining the
policy delivered to him by an expert manufacturer of such commodities
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legal assistance if he did. 147 The Minnesota court, in common with
many other jurisdictions, has refused to adopt such a fiction in two
classes of cases. If a suit is brought to reform the policy, upon the
ground of mutual mistake, the purpose of the suit is to show that
the written instrument does not in fact represent the contract of
the parties, and parol evidence is admissible for that purpose. 1' 8 In
such a case, the acceptance and retention of the policy may be evidence l 4 9 that the insured has read and assented to its terms, but it

may be shown that he did not do so.iO And if the insured, at the
time he accepted the policy, was misled by the conduct of the company or its agent into a belief that it was satisfactory, he may show
that he relied upon the company and did not read it.l These relaxations of the rule have opened the door to proof that the policy
delivered is not the policy applied for by the insured.
The circumstances under which a court will be justified in rethan he does of taking down the motor-car that he purchases in order to discover possible defects in its manufacture. And for the ordinary purchaser
it would be easier on examination to detect defects in the manufacture of
an automobile purchased, than in the manufacture of 'protection' purchased
and evidenced by a complicated writing. It is now generally recognized by
the public at large, and by some courts as well, that it is only rarely that
even careful business men do in fact read insurance policies delivered to
them." Vance, Handbook of the Law of Insurance, 2d ed., p. 215.
147 Cf. the classic denunciation of the practices of insurance companies by Doe, J., in De Lancey v. Rockingham Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., (1873) 52 N. H. 581: "When the premium payer complained that he
had been defrauded, it was not, in the opinion of the legislature, a sufficient answer to say that, if he had been wise enough, taken time enough,
had good eyes enough, and been reckless enough in the use of them to read
the mass of fine print, and had been scholar, business man and lawyer enough
to understand its full force and effect, he would have been alarmed, and
would not have been decoyed into the trap that was set for him."
' 48Kelly v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., (1907) 102 Minn.
178, 111 N. W. 395, 112 N. W. 870, 1019. See also the cases cited in
footnote
153.
149Haley v. Sharon Township Mut. Fire Ins. Co., (1920) 147 Minn.
190, 179 N. W. 895; Shake v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., (1924) 158 Minn.
40, 196 N. W. 804.
'-5Norman v. Kelso Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., (1911) 114 Minn.
49, 130 N. W. 13; Spurr v. Home Ins. Co., (1889) 40 Minn. 424, 42 N. W.
206. Cf. McCarty v. New York Life Ins. Co., (1898) 74 Minn. 530, 77
N. W. 426 (rescission).
'51Otte v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., (1903) 88 Minn. 423, 93 N. W. 608;
Finn v. Modern Brotherhood of America, (1912) 118 Minn. 307, 136 N. W.
850; Olsson v. Midland Ins. Co., (1917) 138 Minn. 424, 165 N. W. 474;
Zimmerman v. Bankers Casualty Co., (1917) 138 Minn. 442, 165 N. W.
271; Gruberski v. Brotherhood of Amer. Yeomen, (1921) 149 Minn. 49,
182 N. W. 716; Shake v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., (1924) 158 Minn. 40,
196 N. W. 804; Schmitt v. .United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., (1926)
169 Minn. 106, 210 N. W. 846.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

forming an insurance policy have been stated clearly and directly :152

"Before a court of equity will interfere to reform a written
instrument, it must appear, substantially as alleged in the pleadings,
that there was in fact a valid agreement sufficiently expressing in
terms the real intention of the parties, that there was in fact a
written contract which failed to express such true intention, and
that this failure was due to mutual mistake, or to mistake of one
side and fraud or inequitable conduct of the other. These facts
must be established by competent evidence, which is consistent and
not contradictory, clear and not equivocal, convincing and not
doubtful. Mere preponderance of testimony is not sufficient. Such
relief will be extended to those only who have not, by their own
conduct (as laches, negligence or otherwise) put themselves in
such a position as to render it unjust to change the situation, especially when such change might injuriously affect the rights or
status of innocent third parties."
Upon this basis, the Minnesota court repeatedly has permitted
reformation of an insurance policy on the ground of mutual mistake, in that the policy delivered did not represent the real contract.'2 2 Failure to read the policy is not such negligence as will
The remedy is open to the insurance company, as
prevent relief.'
well as to the insured.15 But in all these cases, it must be established
that there was in fact a real agreement ; if the minds of the parties
never met,"5 6 or if the mistake in the terms of the policy was unilateral only,' 57 there can be no reformation. The amount of proof
required to establish the facts has given some difficulty. The evi' 5 Norman v. Kelso Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., (1911) 114 Minn. 49,
130 N. W. 13 (quoting from Fritz v. Fritz, (1905) 94 Minn. 262. 102 N. W.
705) ; Mahoney v. Minnesota Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., (1917) 136 Minn. 34,
161 N. W. 217.
5
r3Spurr v. Home Ins. Co., (1889) 40 Minn. 424, 42 N. W. 206;
Norman v. Kelso Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., (1911) 114 Minn. 49, 130
N. W. 13; Haley v. Sharon Township Mut. Fire Ins. Co., (1920) 147 Minn.
190, 179 N. W. 895; Mahoney v. Minnesota Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., (1917)
136 Minn. 34, 161 N. W. 217; Sundin v. County Fire Ins. Co., (1919) 144
Minn. 100, 174 N. W. 729; Page v. Rollingstone Mut. Farmers Fire Ins. Co.,
(1926) 166 Minn. 74, 207 N. W. 24; Hartigan v. Norwich Union Indemnity
Co., (Minn. 1933) 246 N. W. 477; see Collins v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
(1890) 44 Minn. 440, 46 N. W. 906.
Ins. Co.,
154Norman v. Kelso Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., (1911) 114 Minn.
49, 130 N. W. 13. Cf. Haley v. Sharon Township Mut. Fire Ins. Co., (1920)
147 Minn.
190, 179 N. W. 895.
155Haley v. Sharon Township Mut. Fire Ins. Co., (1920) 147 Minn.
190, 179
N. W. 895.
"56 Guernsey v. American Ins. Co., (1871) 17 Minn. 104 (Gil. 83)
Seiler v. Commercial Acc. Ins. Co., (1921) 150 Minn. 353, 185 N. W. 383.
57Fredman v. Consolidated Fire & Marine Ins. Co., (1908) 104 Minn.
76, 116 N. W. 221; Zenith Box & Lumber Co. v. National Union Fire Ins.
Co., (1920) 144 Minn. 386, 175 N. W. 894.
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dence must be "dear and convincing ;,,"' it must be more than a

mere preponderance of the testimony, 59 more than is required for
a rescission of the contract, 160 but it need not be proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. 6 ' The rule is
... at least a warning to the trier of fact, judge, or jury, that
the issue upon which a finding is sought is such that care should be
exercised, an issue which is a little out of the usual, for . . . the

plaintiff seeking a recovery presents a paper not authorizing it, and
asks that it be changed so that he may recover."' 1 2
The conduct of the insurance agent by which the insured is
deceived or misled in his acceptance of the policy may take a number of different forms, but in general the situations presented involve the same essential element. The agent delivers a policy and
collects the premium when the agent has knowledge, and the insured does not, of circumstances which will prevent the policy
from providing the insurance expected. Two typical cases will
serve as an illustration:
(1) The applicant, who owns a building on which there is already fire insurance to the amount of $500, applies to the defendant company for additional insurance in the amount of $800. Defendant's agent, with knowledge of the existing insurance, delivers
to the applicant defendant's policy, which provides that it shall be
void if there is other insurance upon the property. The applicant,
relying upon the agent in good faith, accepts the policy and pays
the premium. The building is destroyed by fire, and he then reads
the policy and discovers for the first time that it provides no insurance. Obviously in such a case the applicant has been misled by
the wrongful conduct of the agent. 6 s
' 58See Norman v. Kelso Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., (1911) 114 Minn.

49, 130 N. W. 13; Mahoney v. Minnesota Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., (1917) 136
Minn.5934, 161 N. W. 217.
' Remley v. Travelers Ins. Co., (1909) 108 Minn. 31, 121 N. W. 230;
see Mahoney v. Minnesota Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., (1917) 136 Minn. 34,
161 N.
W. 217.
' 60 See McCarty v. New York Life Ins. Co., (1898) 74 Minn. 530, 77
N. W.
426.
161Wall v. Meilke, (1903) 89 Minn. 232, 94 N. W. 688 (overruling on
this point Guernsey v. American Ins. Co., (1871) 17 Minn. 184 (Gil. 83)) ;
see Mahoney v. Minnesota Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., (1917) 136 Minn. 34, 161
N. W. 217; Hartigan v. Norwich Union Indemnity Co., (Minn. 1933) 246
N. W. 477.
162Dibell, J. in Hartigan v. Norwich Union Indemnity Co., (Minn.
1933) 246 N. W. 477, citing 5 Wigmore, Evidence, 2d ed., se. 2498 (3),
and Southard v. Curley, (1892) 134 N. Y. 148, 31 N. E. 330. 16 L. R. A.
561, 30 Am. St. Rep. 642.
163Cf. Anderson v. Manchester Fire Assur. Co., (1894) 59 Minn. 182,
60 N. W. 1095, 64 N. W. 241.
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(2) The applicant, who is afflicted with diabetes, applies for a
policy of life insurance. He makes oral answers to the questions
on the application blank, in which he truthfully states the condition of his health. The agent fills out the application, falsely stating that the applicant has no kidney disease, and has not consulted
a doctor within the past three years. The applicant, relying on
the agent, signs the application without reading it. A policy is
issued, containing the usual provision that it shall be void if the
statements in the application are not true. The applicant accepts
the policy, and pays the premiums. He dies, and it then is discovered that the company may avoid the policy. Here again it is clear
that he has been misled.'
In such cases, reformation of the instrument is a possible
remedy, since there is mistake on the one side, and fraud, or at
least inequitable conduct, on the other.1"' But the difficulty of proving by convincing evidence 6 ' the actual agreement of the parties,
without which the policy cannot be reformed,' 67 together with the
fact that the suit is in equity and there is no right to a jury trial,
have combined to make this remedy comparatively unpopular."'I
Instead, the action is brought at law upon the policy, and the provisions avoiding liability are met by the application of waiver or
estoppel.
These terms have been used more or less interchangeably by
the courts,6 9 with resulting confusion as to their meaning. But
in at least one case 17 0 the Minnesota court has recognized that an
important distinction exists between the two. Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right; it is the expression of an
164Cf. Otte v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., (1903) 88 Minn. 423, 93 N. W.
608. This situation is discussed in detail in the note in (1932) 16 MiNNESOTA 65
LAw REVIEw 422.
1 Kelly v. Citizens Mut. Fire Ass'n, (1905) 96 Minn. 477, 105 N. W.
675; Central State Bank v. Royal Indemnity Co., (1926) 167 Minn. 494, 210
N. W. 66. Rescission of the contract is also possible, McCarty v. New
York Life Ins. Co., (1898) 74 Minn. 530, 77 N. W. 426, but of course this
would66 be of no advantage to the insured after loss has occurred.
'167See text at footnotes 158 to 162.
Guernsey v. American Ins. Co., (1871) 17 Minn. 104 (Gil. 83)
Seiler v. Commercial Acc. Ins. Co., (1921) 150 Minn. 353, 185 N. W. 383.
16sSee (1931) 15 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 596.
169Compare, in substantially identical cases, Brandup v. St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co., (1880) 27 Minn. 393, 7 N. W. 735 (waiver) with Bemis
v. Pacific Coast Cas. Co., (1914) 125 Minn. 54, 145 N. W. 622 (estoppel) ;
also Otte v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., (1903) 88 Minn. 423, 93 N. W. 608
(waiver) with Enge v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., (1931) 183 Minn.
117, 236 N. W. 207 (estoppel). See also Hohag v. Northland Pine Co.,
(1920)7 147 Minn. 38, 179 N. W. 485; Ewart, Waiver Distributed, pp. 31-33.
' oParsons, Rich & Co. v. Lane, (1906) 97 Minn. 98, 106 N. W. 485.
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intention not to insist upon what the law affords. It is consensual
in its nature; the intention may be inferred from conduct, and the
knowledge may be actual or constructive, but both knowledge' 7
and intent are essential elements.172 Estoppel, on the other hand,
is not consensual in character. It is recognized, not to give effect
to a presumed intention,'but to defeat the inequitable intent of the
party estopped. Strictly speaking, an estoppel in pais arises when
one party makes, by word or act, a false representation of fact, to
induce action, and the other party in good faith reasonably relies
upon it to his detriment. 7 The distinction is important in connection with questions of pleading, 7 4 the parol evidence rule,17 the
authority of particular agents, 7 6 and the good faith of the insured.177 The constant interchange of the two terms by the courts
has resulted in some uncertainty as to the law. It has been urged,
apparently with reason, that the lawv of insurance would be sinplified if both "waiver" and "estoppel" were abandoned, and "election" substituted in the situations considered.'7 "
17t An insurance company does not waive its rights without knowledge
of the facts. Parsons, Rich & Co. v. Lane, (1906) 97 Minn. 98, 106 N. W.
485; McFarland v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., (1891) 46 Minn. 519. 49
N. W. 253; St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Parsons, (1891) 47 Minn.
352, 50 N. W. 240; First Nat'l Bank v. Manchester Fire Assur. Co., (1896)
64 Minn. 96, 66 N. W. 136; Murphy v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., (1903) 106
Minn. 112, 118 N. W. 355; Louden v. Modern Brotherhood, (1909) 107
Minn.7 2 12, 119 N. W. 425.
1
See Parsons, Rich & Co. v. Lane, (1906) 97 Minn. 98, 106 N. W.
485. 73
1 The distinction is pointed out in Vance, Handbook of the Law of
Insurance,
2d ed., pp. 451-458.
174Waiver must be affirmatively pleaded. Bienhoff v. North Amer. Acc.
Ins. Co., (1922) 153 Minn. 241, 190 N. W. 63. Estoppel, in Minnesota,
may be shown under a general denial. Bemis v. Pacific Coast Cas. Co.,
(1914)75 125 Minn. 54, 145 N. W. 622.
1 The parol evidence rule will prevent proof of a contemporaneous
parol waiver of the terms of a contract. Calmenson v. Equitable Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., (1904) 92 Minn. 390, 100 N. WV.88; Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Mowry, (1877) 98 U. S. 544, 24 L. Ed. 674. It does not prevent proof of
facts creating an estoppel. Kausal v. Minnesota Farmers Mut. Fire Ins.
Ass'n,76 (1883) 31 Minn. 17, 16 N. W. 430, 47 Am. Rep. 776.
177 Considered in connection with non-waiver clauses, footnotes 199-203.
1 Estoppel requires good faith on the part of the insured. .Mudge v.
Supreme Court I. 0. F., (1907) 149 Mich. 467, 112 N. W. 1130, 14 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 279, 119 Am. St. Rep: 686. Waiver, being merely the voluntary
relinquishment of a right, should not be affected by the conduct of the
other78party.
Ewart, Waiver Distributed 7; Ewart, Waiver in Insurance Cases,
(1905) 18 Harv. L. Rev. 364; Ewart, Election in Insurance Cases, (1912)
12 Col. L. Rev. 619; Ewart, Waiver or Election, (1916) 29 Har'. L. Rev.
724; Ewart, "Waiver" in Insurance Law, (1928) 13 Iowa L. Rev. 129;
Ewart, Waiver in Insurance Law, (1926) 35 Yale L. J. 970. Cf. Ewart,
Professor Williston's Review of Waiver, (1927) 11 MINrsoTA LAw
REvIEv 415.
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When an agent delivers an insurance policy and collects the
premium, with knowledge of circumstances which will prevent effective insurance, the court frequently has said that there is a
"waiver" of the particular clause in the policy which relieves the
company from liability.'7 9 The objection to the use of this term,
apart from its general ambiguity, is that there can be no right to
avoid the policy until it has taken effect as a contract, and the
"waiver," used in the sense of a relinquishment of that right, must
therefore be either promissory, or else an expression of intention
not to insist upon it, contemporaneous with the delivery of the
policy. In either case, the parol evidence rule should prevent
proof of it to vary the terms of the instrument. 18 On the other
hand, estoppel, which the Minnesota court has found in a few
cases,181 is not affected by the parol evidence rule, 182 and may be
supported upon the theory that the company's agent, by delivering
the policy to the insured, has represented to him as a fact that it
contains nothing to invalidate the insurance, and that the insured,
in reliance upon this representation, has accepted the policy and
paid the premium.

8 3

179Brandup v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., (1880) 27 Minn. 393,
7 N. W. 735; Wilson v. Minnesota Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n, (1886)
36 Minn. 112, 30 N. W. 401, 1 Am. St. Rep. 659; First Nat'l Bank v.
American Central Ins. Co., (1894) 58 Minn. 492, 60 N. W. 345; Anderson
v. Manchester Fire Assur. Co., (1894) 59 Minn. 182, 60 N. W. 1095, 64
N. W. 241; Quigley v. St. Paul Title Ins. & Trust Co., (1895) 60 Minn.
275, 62 N. W. 287; Kells v. Northwestern Live Stock Ins. Co., (1896) 64
Minn. 390, 67 N. W. 215, 71 N. W. 5; Andrus v. Maryland Cas. Co.,
(1904) 91 Minn. 358, 98 Minn. 200.
180 Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mowry, (1877) 96 U. S. 544, 24 L.
Ed. 674; Thompson v. Insurance Co., (1881) 104 U. S. 252, 259, 26 L. Ed:
765; Gray v. Insurance Co., (1898) 155 N. Y. 180, 49 N. E. 675; Fitchburg Say. Bank v. Amazon Ins. Co., (1878) 125 Mass. 431; National Mut.
Ben. Ass'n v. Hickman, (1887) 86 Ky. 256, 5 S. W. 565; Germania Ins.
Co. v. Bromwell, (1896) 62 Ark. 45, 34 S. W. 83; Mobile Life Ins. Co.
v. Pruett, (1882) 74 Ala. 497. See Vance, Handbook of the Law of Insurance, 2d ed., 530; Calmenson v. Equitable Mut. Fire Ins. Co., (1904) 92
Minn. 390, 100 N. W. 88.
8
8' Kausal v. Minnesota Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n, (1883) 31 Minn.
17, 16 N. W. 430, 47 Am. Rep. 776; Bemis v. Pacific Coast Cas. Co., (1914)
125 Minn. 54, 145 N. W. 622; Enge v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
(1931) 183 Minn. 117, 236 N. W. 207.
182Kausal v. Minnesota Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n, (1883) 31 Minn.
17, 16 N. W. 430, 47 Am. Rep. 776.
183 "Plaintiff had a right to expect a policy that would permit the other
insurance which the defendant knew he desired and intended to procure;
and when the policy came to him, he had a right to assume that it was such
as he had applied for, and that the company waived any conditions in the
policy apparently inconsistent with his right to procure the other insurance." Brandup v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., (1880) 27 Minn. 393,
7 N. W. 735.
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On one theory or another, the court has held the company liable
upon the policy in a large number of cases where the agent had
knowledge of facts which would prevent the insurance from being
effective, at the time the policy was delivered.184 Except in the case
of brokers, 8 5 the agent is held to be"the representative of the company in all matters connected with the taking of the application. "'
' 8 4Brandup v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., (1880) 27 Minn. 393,
7 N. W. 735; Kausal v. Minnesota Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n, (1883)
31 Minn. 17, 16 N. W. 430, 47 Am. Rep. 776; Wilson v. Minnesota Farmers
Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n, (1886) 36 Minn. 112, 30 N. W. 401, 1 Am. St. Rep.
659; Whitney v. National Masonic Ace. Ass'n, (1894) 57 Minn. 472, 59
N. W. 943; First Nat'l Bank v. American Central Ins. Co., (1894) 58
Mirn. 492, 60 N. W. 345; Anderson v. Manchester Fire Assur. Co., (1894)
59 Minn. 182, 60 N. W. 1095, 64 N. W. 241; Quigley v. St. Paul Title Ins.
& Trust Co., (1895) 60 Minn. 275, 62 N. W. 287; Kells v. Northwestern
Live Stock Ins. Co., (1896) 64 Minn. 390, 67 N. W. 215, 71 N. W. 5;
Otte v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., (1903) 88 Minn. 423, 93 N. W. 608;
Andrus v. Maryland Cas. Co., (1904) 91 Minn. 358, 98 N. W. 200; Hartley v. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co., (1904) 91 Minn. 382, 98 N. XV. 198;
Price v. Washington Life Ins. Co., (1904) 92 Minn. 251, 99 N. W. 810;
White v. Standard Life & Ace. Ins. Co., (1905) 95 Minn. 77, 103 N. \V.
735, 884; Finn v. Modern Brotherhood of America, (1912) 118 Minn. 307,
136 N. W. 850; Bemis v. Pacific Coast Cas. Co., (1914) 125 Minn. 54, 145
N. W. 622; Olsson v. Midland Ins. Co., (1917) 138 Minn. 424, 165 N. W.
474; Zimmerman v. Bankers Cas. Co., (1917) 138 Minn. 442, 165 N. W.
271; Gruberski v. Brotherhood of Amer. Yeomen, (1921) 149 Minn. 49,
182 N. W. 716; Kearns v. North Amer. Life & Cas. Co., (1921) 150 Minn.
486, 185 N. XV. 659; Mack v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., (1926) 167 Minn.
53, 208 N. W. 410; Jepson v. Central Business Men's Ass'n, (1926) 168
Minn. 19, 209 N. W. 487; Schmitt v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co., (1926) 169 Minn. 106, 210 N. W. 846; Schmitt v. Massachusetts Protective Ass'n, (1927) 170 Minn. 60, 212 N. W. 5; Bullock v. New York
Life Ins. Co., (1930) 182 Minn. 192, 233 N. W. 858; Enge v. John Hncock Mut. Life Ins. Co., (1931) 183 Minn. 117, 236 N. W. 907; Hafner v.
Prudential Ins. Co., (Minn. 1933) 247 N. W. 576.
Many of these cases make no reference either to waiver or estoppel.
See for example Zimmerman v. Bankers Cas. Co., (1917) 138 Minn. 442, 165
N. W. 271, holding merely that where the agent falsifies the application
without the knowledge of the applicant, the error is chargeable to the insurer. Some element of waiver or estoppel is necessary, however, if the
policy provides that the insured warrants the truth of all statements niade
in the application, and that it shall be void if they are false. See Otte v.
Hartford
Life Ins. Co., (1903) 88 Minn. 423, 93 N. W. 608.
'85 By statute, Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat. sec. 3757, a broker is the agent
of the insurance company for the collection of premiums. He is not the
agent of the company for other purposes, and knowledge which fie acquires
in negotiating for the insurance is not imputed to the company. Gude v.
Exchange Fire Ins. Co., (1893) 53 Minn. 220, 54 N. W. 1117; Fredman
v. Consolidated Fire & Marine Ins. Co., (1908) 104 Minn. 76, 116 N. W.
221. Cf. Zenith Box & Lumber Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., (1920)

144 Minn. 386, 175 Minn. 894. A contrary rule is applied in some other
states. See Welch v. Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia, (1904) 120 Wis. 456, 98
N. W.6 227.
1S Kausal v. Minnesota Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n, (1883) 31
Minn. 17, 16 N. W. 430, 47 Am. Rep. 776; Mahoney v. Minnesota Farmers
Mut. Ins. Co., (1917) 136 Minn. 34, 161 N. W. 217; Enge v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., (1931) 183 Minn. 117, 236 N. W. 207. Cf. Pettit
v. State Ins. Co., (1889) 41 Minn. 299, 43 N. W. 378.
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Any information which he acquires while acting within the scope
of his authority8 7 will be imputed to the company. 88 If the agent,
after the applicant has stated the facts, falsifies the application
without the applicant's knowledge, the responsibility for the act is
upon the company.8 9 If, on the other hand, the applicant knew at
the time he signed the application that the agent had inserted false
answers, the responsibility is his, as well as the agent's, and the
company may set up the misrepresentations to avoid the policy.'9 0
This result lends color to the estoppel theory, since the applicant
clearly is not justified in relying upon any "representation" of the
agent in such a case.' 9 '
The effect of all these decisions is to permit the insured to recover, in an action at law, upon a written contract which does not
' 87 1nformation acquired by the agent while acting outside the scope of
his authority will not be charged to the company. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Parsons, (1891) 47 Minn. 352, 50 N. W. 240 (infornation acquired in the course of other employment, in no way connected with
the agency); Shaughnessy v. New York Life Ins. Co., (1925) 163 Minn.
134, 203 N. W. 600 (information acquired by soliciting agent through
personal acquaintance with applicant, not connected with taking of application). 88
Kausal v. Minnesota Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n, (1883) 31
Minn. 17, 16 N. W. 430, 47 Am. Rep. 776; Wilson v. Minnesota Farmers
Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n, (1886) 36 Minn. 112, 30 N. W. 401, 1 Am. St. Rep.
659; Andrus v. Maryland Cas. Co., (1904) 91 Minn. 358, 98 N. W. 200;
Kelly v. Citizens Mut. Fire Ass'n, (1905) 96 Minn. 477, 105 N. W. 675:
Bemis v. Pacific Coast Cas. Co., (1914) 125 Minn. 54, 145 N. W. 622;
Enge v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., (1931) 183 Minn. 117, 236
N. W. 207.
' 89 Kausal v. Minnesota Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n, (1883) 31 Minn.
17, 16 N. W. 430, 47 Am. Rep. 776; Whitney v. National Masonic Ace.
Ass'n, (1894) 57 Minn. 472, 59 N. W. 943; Otte v. Hartford Life Ins. Co..
(1903) 88 Minn. 423, 93 N. W. 608; Olsson v. Midland Ins. Co., (1917)
138 Minn. 424, 165 N. W. 474; Zimmerman v. Bankers Cas. Co., (1917)
.138 Minn. 442, 165 N. W. 271; Kearns v. North Amer. Life & Cas. Co.,
(1921) 150 Minn. 486, 185 N. W. 659.
19°Mattson v. Modern Samaritans, (1904) 91 Minn. 434, 98 N. W. 330;
Bratley v. Brotherhood of Amer. Yeomen, (1924) 159 Minn. 14, 198 N. W.
128; see Zimmerman v. Bankers Cas. Co., (1917) 138 Minn. 442, 165 N. V.
271.
In Shaughnessy v. New York Life Ins. Co., (1925) 163 Minn. 134, 203
N. W. 600, the application was filled out by a medical examiner, who inserted false answers to the questions without reading them to the applicant.
She signed the application without reading it. It was held that she could
not recover. "She had the opportunity and the ability to read it, and.
in these circumstances, the law does not permit a party to avoid his contract by showing that he did not know what it contained." Apparently the
basis of the decision is that the applicant, knowing the state of her health,
must have knowledge that false answers would be inserted in an application made out under such circumstances. See the references to the case in
Enge v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., (1931) 183 Minn. 117, 236 N. W.
207, and Hafner v. Prudential Ins. Co., (Minn. 1933) 247 N. W. 576.
191See Vance, Handbook of the Law of Insurance, 2d ed., 524.
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authorize recovery.

They have been subjected to vigorous criti-

cism, upon the ground that such issues properly should be referred
to the equity side of the court, where parol evidence will be withdrawn from the consideration of the jury,1912 and that they place a
premium upon false testimony, and compel the insurance company,
in spite of all it can do, to insure risks which no underwriter would
accept.193 Notwithstanding these objections, the principle of these
cases is well established in Minnesota and the great majority of
other states.19
It should be noted that the rule of the federal
courts is to the contrary, since they refuse to admit parol evidence
to show that the insured was misled by the company's agent."'
The unfortunate result is that a removal to federal court upon the
basis of diversity of citizenship will mean a change in the applicable law.'"9
Attempts on the part of the insurance companies to escape
responsibility for the misconduct of their agents by provisions in
92
Richards, Parol Waiver Under the New York Fire Policy. (1912)
12 Col. L. Rev. 134; Richards, Election in Insurance Cases, (1913) 13 Col.
L. Rev. 51; Price, How Far Does Knowledge of an Agent Affect tile
Defense of Fraud in an Action on a Life Insurance Policy, (1924) 18 I1. L.
Rev. 377; note, L. R. A. 1915A 279.
19See the concurring opinion of Stone, J., in Hafner v. Prudential
Ins. Co., (Minn. 1933) 247 N. XV. 576: "This decision . . . establishes a
rule of decision law which compels life insurance companies to insure the
lives of some persons afflicted with disease bound to end fatally and soon.
The result is plainly against public policy and abhorrent to the whole theory
of life insurance, and to the practice of all reputable underwriters-a theory
of sanity and a practice of safety courts should sustain rather than thwart.
Here we are imposing an unintended, anomalous, and dangerous liability
in spite of every precaution that honest, law-abiding insurers can take. It
is imposed against, and in spite of, explicit condition precedent to liability,
by reason solely of what interested persons testify was or was not done by
the soliciting agent, who had no power to waive any condition of the policy.
The process is so simple and so easy, and its rewards so generous, that the
result is a premium for perjury, of which our law already offers too many
in its various facilities for the success of synthetic causes of action and
defenses."
Mr. Justice Stone also dissented in Enge v. John Hancock Mut. Life
Ins. Co., (1931) 183 Minn. 117, 236 N. W. 207, a case where the agent
falsified the application, upon the ground that the policy contained a condition that it should not take effect unless the applicant was in good health
on the date of the policy.

See discussion in (1932)

16 MINNESOTA l.Aw

REv-mv 422.
194Vance, Handbook of the Law of Insurance, 2d ed., 507.
195 Northern Assur. Co. v. Grand View Bldg. Ass'n, (1902) 183 U. S.
308, 22 Sup. Ct. 133, 46 L. Ed. 213; Lumber Underwriters v. Rife, (1915)
237 U. S.609, 35 Sup. Ct. 717, 59 L. Ed. 1140; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Moore,
(1913) 231 U. S.543, 34 Sup. Ct. 186, 58 L. Ed. 356.
' 9 6Since a question of general commercial law is involved, the federal
courts are compelled to follow the federal rule, rather than the state law.
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, (1913) 231 U. S.543, 34 Sup. Ct. 186, 58
L. Ed. 356; MacKelvie v. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1923)
287 Fed. 660.
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the application or the policy have been comparatively unsuccessful.
A clause in the policy providing that the soliciting agent, in taking
the application, shall be deemed the agent of the applicant, and not
of the company, has been held to be totally ineffective, as contrary
to fact.9 7 Although the question has not been passed upon directly
in Minnesota, it seems clear that a similar clause in the application
would have no more effect. 98 Stipulations to the effect that the
agent shall have no power to waive any term or condition of the
policy have met with somewhat better success. 19 If such a provision is a general one, extending to all agents of the coml)any, or
if it is made applicable to general agents, as distinguished from
mere solicitors, it is well settled that it is not effective, since the
company can act only through such agents, and it will not be permitted to disable itself by such a limitation upon its own power to
contract.0- 9 As restricted to inferior agents, who have not full contracting powers, such as solicitors, such a stipulation may serve as
notice to the insured that the agent with whom he is dealing has
no power to vary the terms of the contract, and so prevent any
"waiver" with apparent authority. 2 1 Even for this purpose, the
' 97 Kausal v. Minnesota Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n, (1883)
Minn. 817, 16 N. W. 430, 47 Am. Rep. 776.
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19 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat. secs. 3516, 3380; Vance, Handbook of the
Law of Insurance, 2d ed., 144; Sternaman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
(1902) 170 N. Y. 13, 616, 62 N. E. 763, 63 N. E. 1122, 57 L. R. A. 318, 88
Am. St. Rep. 625; Continental Ins. Co. v. Pearce, (1888) 39 Kan 396, 18
Pac. 291, 7 Am. St. Rep. 557. See (1932) 16 MININsorA LAw Riwigw
422, 423.
199 See Warner, The Effect of a Provision in an Insurance Policy
Limiting the Authority of an Agent to Alter the Contract, (1918) 6 Cal.

L. Rev.
00 203.

2 Lamberton v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co.. (1888) 39 Minn. 129, 39
N. W. 76, 1 L. R. A. 222; St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Parsons,
(1891) 47 Minn. 352, 50 N. W. 240; Andrus v. Maryland Cas. Co., (1904)
91 Minn. 358, 98 N. W. 200; Leland v. Modern Samaritans, (1910) 111
Minn. 207, 126 N. W. 728; see Wilkins v. State Ins. Co., (1890) 43 Minn.
177, 45 N. W. 1; but see Goldin v. Northern Assur. Co., (1891) 46 Minn.
471, 49 N. W. 246. In Bowman v. Surety Fund Life Ins. Co., (1921) 149
Minn. 118, 182 N. W. 991, a provision that "agents" should have no power
to waive was held not applicable to the medical director of the company.
2olWilkins v. State Ins. Co., (1890) 43 Minn. 177, 45 N. W. 1; Goldin
v. Northern Assur. Co., (1891) 46 Minn. 471, 49 N. W. 246. In the first
of these cases the policy provided that none of its terms could be waived
except by the secretary of the company. A local agent assumed to waive
the provision of the policy that the insurance was not to take effect until
the payment of the first premium. The policy was delivered, but not read.
It was held that the agent had no authority, actual or apparent, to waive
the terms of the policy.
It would seem that such a non-waiver clause in the policy cannot have
any effect upon transactions occurring before delivery of the policy. See
Vance, Handbook of the Law of Insurance, 2d ed., 434. The point never
has been raised in Minnesota. The provision, however, usually is inserted
in the application.
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provision will be interpreted to apply only to those conditions and
terms in the policy which relate to the formation and continuance
of the contract of insurance, and not to those conditions, such as
notice and proof of loss, which are to be performed after the loss
has occurred.20 2 And even though the stipulation may prevent a
4.waiver," it does not affect the responsibility of the company for
any wrongful conduct of the agent, in the course of his employ2 0- 3
ment, sufficient to set up an estoppel.
202C. S. Brackett & Co. v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., (1918)
140 Minn. 271, 167 N. W. 798; Reilly v. Linden, (1921) 151 Minn. 1, 186
N. W. 121; see Hartley v. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co., (1904) 91 Minn.
382, 98 Minn. 198.
203
Enge v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., (1931) 183 .Minn. 117,
236 N. W. 207.

